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Notes
PRESCRIBING A CHANGE TO THE FDA’S
DRUG LABELING RULES AFTER THE 21ST
CENTURY CURES ACT
P. SYDNEY ENGLE†
ABSTRACT
Signed into law in 2016, the 21st Century Cures Act offers new hope
to patients by empowering the FDA to expedite review of innovative,
potentially lifesaving drugs. But these expedited approvals raise the risk
that pivotal drug safety and efficacy data will not arise until after the
drug is already on the market. The Cures Act failed to respond to two
key aspects of shifting the discovery of safety and efficacy data to the
postmarket phase. First, the Cures Act did not correspondingly
enhance the FDA’s authority to require manufacturers to generate and
disclose postmarket information. Second, it did not guard against the
potential rise in postmarket failure-to-warn liability for manufacturers,
which could discourage them from investing in the development of
lifesaving drugs. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FDA’s
current brand-name labeling rules exacerbate these two issues by
discouraging meaningful postmarket disclosures to the FDA and
enabling costly failure-to-warn suits against manufacturers. This Note
discusses these two postmarket issues and proposes new drug labeling
rules that would minimize their impact while maintaining the Cures
Act’s efforts to promote patient access to potentially lifesaving
treatments.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the more than twenty-nine thousand people diagnosed each
year with diffuse large B-cell lymphoma,1 up to half will relapse or
eventually stop responding to treatment.2 Before the passage of the
21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”) in 2016,3 those cancer patients
would have remained without any viable options.4 Many of them would
have died within a year.5 Breyanzi, a gene therapy approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) under the Cures Act in 2021,
is poised to change their outcomes.6 In a clinical trial, about 54 percent
of patients achieved full remission, and another 19 percent saw their
condition improve.7

1. Gena Kanas, Wenzhen Ge, Ruben G.W. Quek, Katie Keeven, Knar Nersesyan & Jon E.
Arnason, Epidemiology of Diffuse Large B-cell Lymphoma (DLBCL) and Follicular Lymphoma
(FL) in the United States and Western Europe: Population-Level Projections for 2020–2025, 63
LEUKEMIA & LYMPHOMA 54, 57 (2022) (“The number of incident [diffuse large B-cell
lymphoma] cases in the US is projected to increase from 29,108 to 32,443 . . . with a total rate of
increase of 11% in the US . . . .”); see also What Is Lymphoma?: Diffuse Large B-Cell Lymphoma,
LYMPHOMA RSCH. FOUND., https://lymphoma.org/understanding-lymphoma/aboutlymphoma/
nhl/dlbcl [https://perma.cc/6RXS-HEH8] (“Diffuse large B-cell lymphoma is an aggressive (fastgrowing) NHL that affects B-lymphocytes. . . . [It] can develop in the lymph nodes or in . . . the
gastrointestinal tract, testes, thyroid, skin, breast, bone, brain, or essentially any organ of the
body.”).
2. Michael Crump, Sattva S. Neelapu, Umar Farooq, Eric Van Den Neste, John Kuruvilla,
Jason Westin, Brian K. Link, Annette Hay, James R. Cerhan, Liting Zhu, Sami Boussetta, Lei
Feng, Matthew J. Maurer, Lynn Navale, Jeff Wiezorek, William Y. Go & Christian Gisselbrecht,
Outcomes in Refractory Diffuse Large B-Cell Lymphoma: Results from the International
SCHOLAR-1 Study, 130 BLOOD 1800, 1800 (2017).
3. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
4. See Crump et al., supra note 2 (“[M]ost patients with refractory [diffuse large B-cell
lymphoma] have no curative treatment options.”).
5. See id. at 1803 (finding that patients with refractory diffuse large B-cell lymphoma had a
median overall survival rate of 6.3 months).
6. FDA Approves New Treatment for Adults with Relapsed or Refractory Large-B-Cell
Lymphoma, FDA (Feb. 5, 2021) [hereinafter FDA Approves Breyanzi], https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-new-treatment-adults-relapsed-or-refractorylarge-b-cell-lymphoma [https://perma.cc/7UFM-7AVY].
7. U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approves Bristol Myers Squibb’s Breyanzi
(Lisocabtagene Maraleucel), a New CAR T Cell Therapy for Adults with Relapsed or Refractory
Large B-Cell Lymphoma, BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB (Feb. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Bristol Myers
Squibb, FDA Breyanzi Approval], https://news.bms.com/news/details/2021/U.S.-Food-and-DrugAdministration-Approves-Bristol-Myers-Squibbs-Breyanzi-lisocabtagene-maraleucel-a-NewCAR-T-Cell-Therapy-for-Adults-with-Relapsed-or-Refractory-Large-B-cell-Lymphoma/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ZHV-PGEN].
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Breyanzi’s approval is part of a growing regulatory trend toward
promoting patient access to essential drugs much more quickly.8 The
FDA had granted expedited review to Breyanzi only a year earlier in
February 2020,9 pursuant to its authority under the Cures Act.10
Congress enacted the Cures Act to empower the FDA to expedite
approvals for medicines like Breyanzi that treat serious and potentially
life-threatening diseases.11 As of September 2022, Breyanzi was one of

8. This Note uses “drugs” to refer to both biologics and small molecular weight drugs. As
the FDA explains:
Biological products, like other drugs, are used for the treatment, prevention or cure of
disease in humans. In contrast to chemically synthesized small molecular weight drugs,
which have a well-defined structure and can be thoroughly characterized, biological
products are generally derived from living material—human, animal, or
microorganism—are complex in structure, and thus are usually not fully characterized.
See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, FDA (July 7, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/therapeutic-biologics-applications-bla/frequently-asked-questions-ab
out-therapeutic-biological-products [https://perma.cc/C9RB-AQL4]. Despite their chemical
differences, biologics and small molecule drugs are subject to similar labeling provisions. See 21
C.F.R. § 314.70 (2021) (identifying the postmarket labeling rules for drugs); id. § 601.12
(identifying the postmarket labeling rules for biologics).
9. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Accepts for Priority Review Bristol-Myers
Squibb’s Biologics License Application (BLA) for Lisocabtagene Maraleucel (Liso-cel) for Adult
Patients with Relapsed or Refractory Large B-Cell Lymphoma, BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB (Feb. 13,
2020), https://news.bms.com/news/details/2020/US-Food-and-Drug-Administration-FDA-Accep
ts-for-Priority-Review-Bristol-Myers-Squibbs-Biologics-License-Application-BLA-for-Lisocabt
agene-Maraleucel-liso-cel-for-Adult-Patients-with-Relapsed-or-Refractory-Large-B-Cell-Lymp
homa/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/SYW5-QSZV]. Under the FDA’s standard approval pathway,
eight years typically pass between the FDA’s grant of permission for clinical testing and final drug
approval. Jonathan J. Darrow, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Approval and
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 1983-2018, 323 JAMA 164, 164 (2020).
10. FDA Approves Breyanzi, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Twenty-First Century Cures: Examining the Role of Incentives in Advancing
Treatments and Cures for Patients: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Com., 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rep. Joseph R. Pitts, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Health) (noting that many diseases have no “effective treatments” and that the
House of Representatives “continue[s] to hear about the many unique challenges of developing
and testing therapies for patients with rare diseases and certain types of cancer”); President
Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Pass the 21st Century Cures Act, at 00:41 (Dec. 3, 2016), https:/
/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/03/weekly-address-pass-21st-centurycures-act [https://perma.cc/BK4Z-84B2] (“There’s a bill in Congress that could help unlock cures
for Alzheimer’s, end cancer as we know it, and help people seeking treatment for opioid addiction
finally get the help they need. It’s called the 21st Century Cures Act. It’s an opportunity to save
lives . . . .”); Why the 21st Century Cures Act Offers Hope for Rare Disease Patients, JANSEN’S
FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.thejansensfoundation.org/blog-1/2019/1/22/why-the-21stcentury-cures-act-offers-hope-for-rare-disease-patients [https://perma.cc/KRT6-EGMU] (noting
that “[t]he need for safer, cheaper, more effective, and faster treatment options for rare diseases
is abundantly clear” and that “[t]he Cures Act would take into account the unique characteristics
of rare diseases” to facilitate drug development). About thirty million people in the United States
have a rare disease, which is defined as a disease with a patient population of less than two
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about seventy-nine drugs that the FDA greenlit for expedited review
under the Cures Act’s Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy
(“RMAT”) designation.12
Breyanzi’s expedited approval through the RMAT designation
reflects just one of several changes brought by the Cures Act to
promote patient access to high-efficacy treatments—that is, to
potential cures. The Cures Act also permits the FDA to grant drug
approval without obtaining clinical outcome data, such as survival
rates.13 Instead, the FDA can approve drugs based on real-world
evidence, such as patient-reported data,14 and surrogate endpoints,
such as blood pressure.15 These alternative measures are intended to
predict a drug’s effects on patient outcomes, thus saving manufacturers
the time and expense of directly collecting clinical outcome data.16
Accordingly, these measures help manufacturers bring their drugs to

hundred thousand. FAQs About Rare Diseases, GENETIC & RARE DISEASES INFO. CTR., https://
rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/pages/31/faqs-about-rare-diseases [https://perma.cc/7M2K-LTVS].
Sixty percent of “[a]dults in the [United States] have a chronic disease.” Chronic Diseases in
America, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/infographic/chronic-diseases.htm
[https://perma.cc/NT9G-A5A7], (last updated May 6, 2022, 12:00 AM).
12. Cumulative CBER Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy (RMAT) Designation
Requests Received by Fiscal Year, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/cellulargene-therapy-products/cumulative-cber-regenerative-medicine-advanced-therapy-rmat-design
ation-requests-received-fiscal [https://perma.cc/AE86-R3ZX], (last updated Oct. 11, 2022). The
FDA can designate a treatment as a regenerative advanced therapy if it is a regenerative medicine
therapy, as defined by statute, and “is intended to treat, modify, reverse, or cure a serious or lifethreatening disease or condition” and “has the potential to address unmet medical needs for such
a disease or condition.” 21st Century Cures Act § 3033(a), 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(2)(A)–(C), (g)(8).
13. See 21st Century Cures Act § 3033, 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(6)–(7) (describing the eligibility
criteria for expedited review and the postapproval requirements for regenerative advanced
therapies); see also Jeffrey M. Clarke, Xiaofei Wang & Neal E. Ready, Editorial, Surrogate
Clinical Endpoints To Predict Overall Survival in Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Trials—Are We in
a New Era?, 4 TRANSLATIONAL LUNG CANCER RSCH. 804, 805–07 (2015) (noting that
researchers might use surrogate endpoints to predict overall survival instead of gathering direct
data on survival rates).
14. See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
16. Surrogate Endpoint Resources for Drug and Biologic Development, FDA, https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/surrogate-endpoint-resources-drug-and-biologicdevelopment [https://perma.cc/F2V2-ZYSV], (last updated July 24, 2018); Susan Molchan, James
Rickert & John Powers, The 21st Century Cures Act: More Homework To Do, HEALTH AFFS.
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20150924.050749 [https://per
ma.cc/W87P-SQKP] (“Surrogate outcomes are a substitute for a clinical outcome measure and
typically don’t take as long or cost as much to measure.”).
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market faster.17 They are the reality of modern drug approvals18 and
are pivotal for evaluating treatments that target patient populations
too small to sustain large randomized controlled trials.19
At its best, the Cures Act can provide lifesaving drugs, such as
Breyanzi, that significantly improve patients’ outcomes. But the Cures
Act’s expedited drug approvals create a tradeoff. Although the use of
surrogate endpoints and real-world evidence allows the FDA to
approve essential drugs much faster,20 trials based on these measures
tend to overstate the benefits of treatment relative to trials based on
clinical outcomes.21 Accordingly, these measures make it even more
likely that a drug’s true effects will not become clear until after the drug
is approved and many patients have experienced adverse effects or
failed to see clinical improvements.22
When substantial postmarket issues arise, the FDA or the
manufacturer should change the drug’s label to warn patients of those
risks.23 Take Breyanzi for example. About half of the patients taking
17. See Joseph A. Goble, The Potential Effect of the 21st Century Cures Act on Drug
Development, 24 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 677, 678 (2018) (“The use of
surrogate endpoints in clinical studies may be advantageous when clinical outcomes are difficult
to collect or take an unreasonable amount of time to capture.”); Molchan et al., supra note 16
(calling surrogate endpoints “a shortcut[] to drug approval”).
18. See Surrogate Endpoint Resources for Drug and Biologic Development, supra note 16
(“Between 2010 and 2012, the FDA approved 45 percent of new drugs based on a surrogate
endpoint.”).
19. See Clarke et al., supra note 13, at 805–07 (describing the utility of using surrogate
endpoints instead of overall survival in non-small-cell lung cancer trials when overall survival data
is difficult to obtain and when the sample population is small); cf. Oriana Ciani, Marc Buyse,
Michael Drummond, Guido Rasi, Everardo D. Saad & Rod S. Taylor, Time To Review the Role
of Surrogate End Points in Health Policy: State of the Art and the Way Forward, 20 VALUE
HEALTH 487, 488 (2017) (noting that, in the cardiovascular disease context, “[t]he rates of these
final [clinical] outcomes are . . . typically low . . . thus requiring a definitive trial involving
thousands or tens of thousands of patients followed up for several years” but that “a trial powered
on a surrogate primary end point . . . might involve a few hundred patients followed up for weeks
or months”).
20. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (describing the potential effects of
Aduhelm on patients taking the drug). Even when a drug is approved based on clinical outcome
data, important safety and efficacy information might not materialize until patients have used the
drug for many years. See Molchan et al., supra note 16 (“It can take more than a decade after
approval for important safety information to be discovered and displayed in the label . . . .”).
23. “Postmarket” refers to the time after FDA approval, when the drug is marketed to
patients. See Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, FDA (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/surveillance/postmarketing-surveillance-programs [https://perma.cc/YN2C-9EG3] (“FDA
maintains a system of postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment programs to identify
adverse events that did not appear during the drug approval process.”). “The [FDA] uses this
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Breyanzi could eventually experience adverse effects, including severe
and sometimes fatal neurological reactions.24 Breyanzi’s label currently
carries a boxed warning that notifies patients and their doctors of these
neurological risks.25 The FDA also has required the manufacturer to
conduct postmarket studies of Breyanzi’s long-term safety.26
The FDA’s approval of Aduhelm in 202127 offers a stronger and
still-unfolding cautionary tale of postmarket risks. Although the FDA
approved Aduhelm through an accelerated pathway predating the
Cures Act,28 the same types of postmarket risks will arise from the
Cures Act’s additional expedited pathways and use of surrogate
endpoints and real-world evidence.29 Aduhelm is the first FDAapproved therapy to target the plaques that contribute to cognitive
decline in Alzheimer’s patients and the first Alzheimer’s drug released
to patients since 2003.30 The mere existence of a new treatment has
given hope to many of the over six million people living with
Alzheimer’s in the United States.31 However, Aduhelm’s approval
information to update drug labeling, and, on rare occasions, to reevaluate the approval or
marketing decision.” Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (outlining the procedure for the FDA to
require and initiate label changes in response to new information). For a discussion of
manufacturers’ authority to update drug labels, see infra Part II.A.
24. Bristol Myers Squibb, FDA Breyanzi Approval, supra note 7.
25. FDA Approves Breyanzi, supra note 6. Typically, boxed warnings highlight certain
severe adverse reactions or signal that the drug’s “distribution or use is restricted.” FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND
BOXED WARNING SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS—CONTENT AND FORMAT 11 (2011), https://www.fda.gov/media/71866/
download [https://perma.cc/8PB3-AQR8].
26. Id.
27. See FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for Alzheimer’s Drug, FDA (June 7, 2021), https:/
/www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-grants-accelerated-approval-alzheimersdrug [https://perma.cc/C9LH-GN5K] (“Today, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved
Aduhelm (aducanumab) for the treatment of Alzheimer’s . . . .”).
28. Id. Under the authority of the Cures Act, the FDA considered patient perspectives when
approving Aduhelm. Emily Milligan & Katherine R. McCurdy, Aduhelm Backlash Threatens To
Reverse Progress in FDA’s Reviews of Rare and Ultra-Rare Disease Drugs, STAT (Sept. 14, 2021),
https://www.statnews.com/2021/09/14/aduhelm-backlash-may-imperil-fda-reviews-ultra-raredisease-drugs [https://perma.cc/25JA-A95N].
29. See infra Part I.
30. Jon Hamilton, Cost and Controversy Are Limiting Use of New Alzheimer’s Drug, NPR
(Nov. 8, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/11/08/1052833252/costand-controversy-are-limiting-use-of-new-alzheimers-drug [https://perma.cc/7N4S-TSXA].
31. See Jon Hamilton, For Those Facing Alzheimer’s, a Controversial Drug Offers Hope,
NPR (June 15, 2021, 2:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/06/15/1006297084/
for-those-facing-alzheimers-a-controversial-drug-offers-hope [https://perma.cc/WD6F-4D82]
(noting that “[f]or many patients and their loved ones . . . [Aduhelm’s] approval is seen as a sign
of progress” and quoting one patient who said, “Now there’s hope”); Real Stories Powered by
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generated substantial opposition from doctors and independent expert
advisors within the FDA.32 In approving Aduhelm, the FDA
discounted the available trial data on clinical outcomes, which showed
that Aduhelm might be ineffective.33 Instead, the FDA relied on
measures of amyloid plaque—a surrogate endpoint—that indicated
that Aduhelm might help patients with mild Alzheimer’s symptoms.34
But within the first two years after Aduhelm’s approval, at least two
patients taking the drug reportedly died while experiencing amyloidrelated imaging abnormalities (“ARIA”),35 a reaction that had been
reported, but was not fatal, during Aduhelm’s clinical trials.36
Real People, BREYANZI, https://www.breyanzi.com/patient-stories [https://perma.cc/HJX6XSQV] (noting that one patient said, “You have to hope that there is a chance. That’s what
[Breyanzi] was for me”); ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2022 ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND
FIGURES 19 (2022), https://www.alz.org/media/Documents/alzheimers-facts-and-figures.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/4G2B-LCLE] (“An estimated 6.5 million Americans age 65 and older are living
with Alzheimer’s dementia in 2022.”).
32. See Alice Park & Tara Law, Clinics Won’t Provide It. Insurers Won’t Cover It. So Will
the First Alzheimer’s Drug Make a Difference?, TIME (Aug. 5, 2021, 2:23 PM), https://time.com/
6081333/biogen-alzheimers-drug-aduhelm-fda-controversy [https://perma.cc/27Z8-XM6X] (noting
the controversy surrounding the FDA’s decision to approve Aduhelm despite the fact that ten of
the eleven advisory committee members voted against approval).
33. See TRISTAN MASSIE, KUN JIN, SUE-JANE WANG & JAMES (HSIEN-MING) HUNG, CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., APPLICATION NUMBER: 761178ORIG1S000, STATISTICAL
REVIEW AND EVALUATION: CLINICAL STUDIES 10 (2020) (“[T]he totality of the data does not
seem to support the efficacy of the high dose. There is only one positive study at best and a second
study which directly conflicts with the positive study. Both studies . . . were terminated early for
futility . . . .”).
34. See FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for Alzheimer’s Drug, supra note 27 (“Patients
receiving the treatment [in three studies] had significant dose-and time-dependent reduction of
amyloid beta plaque . . . . These results support the accelerated approval of Aduhelm, which is
based on the surrogate endpoint of reduction of amyloid beta plaque in the brain—a hallmark of
Alzheimer’s disease.”); Steven Woloshin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, What To Know About the
Alzheimer Drug Aducanumab (Aduhelm), 182 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 892, 892 (2022) (“The
FDA recently approved aducanumab (Aduhelm) for people with mild symptoms of Alzheimer
disease . . . .”). But see id. (“Plaque reduction, however, has not been a reliable marker for
cognitive function in past trials.”).
35. Aduhelm (P), FDA: FDA ADVERSE EVENTS REPORTING SYSTEM (FAERS) PUBLIC
DASHBOARD, https://fis.fda.gov/sense/app/95239e26-e0be-42d9-a960-9a5f7f1c25ee/sheet/45bee
b74-30ab-46be-8267-5756582633b4/state/analysis [https://perma.cc/K59R-7TCR], (last updated
June 30, 2022) (full dataset on file with Duke Law Journal) (navigate to Aduhelm, Listing of
Cases, Outcome (Died), Reactions); Pam Belluck, Concerns Grow Over Safety of Aduhelm After
Death of Patient Who Got the Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
11/22/health/aduhelm-death-safety.html [https://perma.cc/2GGV-5ENM].
36. Stephen Salloway, Spyros Chalkias, Frederik Barkhof, Patrick Burkett, Jerome Barakos,
Derk Purcell, Joyce Suhy, Fiona Forrestal, Ying Tian, Kimberly Umans, Guanfang Wang, Priya
Singhal, Samantha Budd Haeberlein & Karen Smirnakis, Amyloid-Related Imaging
Abnormalities in 2 Phase 3 Studies Evaluating Aducanumab in Patients with Early Alzheimer
Disease, 79 JAMA NEUROLOGY 13, 19 (2022).
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Aduhelm’s label currently warns of the risk of ARIA and instructs
doctors to monitor their patients for symptoms.37 It does not direct
patients to stop taking Aduhelm if they experience ARIA.38 Biogen,
the company that manufactures Aduhelm, opened an investigation
into the first ARIA-related death, but neither Biogen nor the FDA has
publicly indicated whether Aduhelm was the cause.39 If Aduhelm
indeed causes fatal ARIA, the FDA could modify Aduhelm’s label40
or, at the extreme, withdraw approval.41 As a condition of its approval
under the accelerated pathway, the FDA has required Biogen to
complete postmarket trials to assess Aduhelm’s clinical benefit.42
Notably, the Cures Act contemplates that the FDA can grant approval
without requiring manufacturers to commit to conducting these
postmarket confirmatory trials.43
Despite its valuable efforts to promote innovative treatments, the
Cures Act failed to respond to two key aspects of shifting the discovery
of safety and efficacy data to the postmarket phase. First, the Cures
Act neglected to give the FDA a much-needed role in postmarket
oversight. Drug approval under the Cures Act is most controversial—
and postmarket oversight is most critical—when the drug shows signs
of low efficacy, as with Aduhelm. But approval of any drug with
lingering safety issues, no matter how efficacious, exemplifies the need
for postmarket review of safety and efficacy data and potentially
postmarket intervention by the FDA. Currently, the FDA’s authority
to require manufacturers to generate and disclose drug safety and
efficacy data is at its weakest after approval.44 Making matters worse,
manufacturers’ willingness and ability to meaningfully disclose
information to the FDA are distorted by market incentives and the
37. Highlights of Prescribing Information (Aduhelm), BIOGEN, https://www.biogencdn.com/
us/aduhelm-pi.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT7K-EA9A] (“Amyloid Related Imaging Abnormalities
(ARIA): Enhanced clinical vigilance for ARIA is recommended during the first 8 doses of
treatment with ADUHELM, particularly during titration. If a patient experiences symptoms
which could be suggestive of ARIA, clinical evaluation should be performed, including MRI
testing if indicated.”).
38. Id.
39. See Belluck, supra note 35; Biogen Probes Death of Aduhelm User After Brain Swelling,
REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2021, 2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/
biogen-probes-death-aduhelm-user-after-brain-swelling-2021-11-09 [https://perma.cc/Z2CL-7WU2].
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (authorizing the FDA to require certain label changes).
41. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2021) (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval of a drug);
id. § 601.43 (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval of a biologic).
42. See FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for Alzheimer’s Drug, supra note 27.
43. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
44. See infra Part II.A (comparing the FDA’s preapproval and postmarket authority).
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current postmarket drug labeling rules,45 which expose manufacturers
to tort liability for failing to warn of certain safety risks.46
Second, the Cures Act failed to address the possibility that the risk
of substantial postmarket liability could disincentivize manufacturers
from investing in life-changing drug development. Under the Cures
Act’s flexible, expedited reviews, manufacturers face a higher-thannormal risk that their drugs will give rise to significant, adverse safety
effects once they are already being used by patients.47 The same
labeling rules that discourage meaningful disclosures also enable
patients to sue manufacturers for failing to warn of these risks on their
drug labels.48 Although this liability may appropriately deter the
marketing of harmful drugs, it could also deter some manufacturers
from incurring the upfront costs of developing potentially lifesaving
treatments.49
This Note discusses these two postmarket issues and proposes new
drug labeling rules that would minimize their impact while maintaining
the Cures Act’s pro-access efforts. Modifying the labeling rules and
strengthening postmarket enforcement of the misbranding provisions
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)50 could
incentivize manufacturers to make meaningful disclosures to the FDA
while protecting their innovative efforts from being deterred by the
risk of postmarket litigation.51 Early, comprehensive disclosures would
ideally enable the FDA to monitor drug safety and efficacy and act on
adverse information before harm is widespread.52 This would
simultaneously protect critically important drug development, reduce
the need for corrective ex post tort litigation, and provide patients with

45. Id. This Note only addresses the FDA’s labeling rules for brand-name drugs, not generic
drugs. Different labeling rules apply to generic drugs. See generally Generic Drugs - Specific
Labeling Resources, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/fdas-labeling-resources-human-prescrip
tion-drugs/generic-drugs-specific-labeling-resources [https://perma.cc/C8HJ-FL2C], (last updated
Aug. 8, 2022) (outlining the FDA labeling rules that are specific to generic drugs).
46. See infra Parts II.A & II.B; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565–71 (2009) (interpreting
the labeling rules to permit a cause of action for failing to warn of adverse events on the drug’s
postmarket label).
47. See infra Part I.
48. See infra Part II.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (authorizing the FDA to take action against a manufacturer
when “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular”).
51. See infra Part IV.
52. See infra Part IV.B.
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access to lifesaving drugs—while allowing patients to weigh their needs
against the drugs’ known safety risks.53
Part I further describes how the Cures Act facilitates patient
access to lifesaving treatments. It then explains how the Cures Act has
shifted the discovery of safety and efficacy information to the
postmarket phase. Part II then discusses the gap in postmarket
oversight and the heightened risk of liability created by the Cures Act
in light of the current labeling rules. Part III responds by proposing
changes to the current labeling rules and FDCA enforcement strategy.
Part IV justifies my proposal as both giving the FDA a new role in
compelling manufacturers to produce postmarket drug information
and protecting manufacturers’ incentives to invest in drug innovation.
I. THE CURES ACT’S TRADEOFF: SHIFTING SAFETY AND EFFICACY
DISCOVERY TO THE POSTMARKET PHASE
The Cures Act beneficially empowers the FDA to quickly review
and approve new drugs for patients facing few options and bleak
outcomes.54 But in shortening the approval timeline and broadening
the FDA’s discretion in granting approvals, the Cures Act shifts the
discovery of safety and efficacy information to the postmarket phase.
The Cures Act fails to address the problems that this shift creates.
Outside of the Cures Act and the FDA’s other expedited
pathways,55 the FDA’s standard approval process is typically long and
costly.56 The manufacturer must first submit an Investigational New
Drug Application (“IND”), which the FDA reviews before authorizing
the manufacturer to begin clinical trials.57 The manufacturer must then

53. Id.
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. The FDA has several other expedited approval pathways that predate the Cures Act. See
generally FDA, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RSCH., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS (2014), https://
www.fda.gov/media/86377/download [https://perma.cc/XEY9-G43V] (describing the various
pathways, including accelerated approval, breakthrough therapy, and priority review
designation).
56. See FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/inform
ation-consumers-and-patients-drugs/fdas-drug-review-process-continued [https://perma.cc/RZ
8M-ZT8A], (last updated Aug. 24, 2015) (describing the steps of the FDA approval process); Step
3: Clinical Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clini
cal-research [https://perma.cc/GLG3-S2CA], (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) (identifying the
approximate time required for each clinical trial stage).
57. Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 56.
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complete trials through phase III.58 These clinical trials can take over
six years,59 cost the manufacturer tens of millions of dollars,60 and
involve hundreds to thousands of patient participants.61 Only after
completing these steps can the manufacturer apply for FDA approval
by filing a New Drug Application (“NDA”)62 for a drug or a Biologic
License Application (“BLA”) for a biologic.63 Typically, around eight
years pass between when the manufacturer can begin clinical trials and
when it receives FDA approval.64 Between 2009 and 2018,
manufacturers spent on average $1.3 billion to develop a single new
drug.65
The Cures Act empowers the FDA to expedite this approval
process and exercise greater discretion in approving rare disease drugs
and other lifesaving treatments. Through these expedited pathways,
including the RMAT designation,66 the Cures Act allows the FDA to
approve drugs based on alternative measures of safety and efficacy
evidence as opposed to clinical outcome data.67 The FDA may consider
58. FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, supra note 56.
59. Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 56.
60. See Thomas J. Moore, Hanzhe Zhang, Gerard Anderson & G. Caleb Alexander,
Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents Approved by the US Food and
Drug Administration, 2015-2016, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1451, 1454 tbl.2 (2018) (estimating
that the mean cost of clinical trials based on clinical outcomes for therapeutic agents approved
from 2015 to 2016 was $64.7 million).
61. Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 56.
62. FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued, supra note 56.
63. See generally Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), FDA (Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber/biolo
gics-license-applications-bla-process-cber [https://perma.cc/QHN5-BE7D] (stating the requirements
for a BLA).
64. Darrow et al., supra note 9, at 164, 168 fig.3; see also Michael S. Kinch, An Overview of
FDA-Approved Biologics, 20 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 393, 394–95 (2015), https://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/sinha/files/kinch2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ8Z-DQUP] (finding that “the
average small molecule product had an average time interval of 8.5 years from the time of IND
submission until final approval, [whereas] the average for all biologics was 7.4 years” between
1982 and 2013).
65. Olivier J. Wouters, Martin McKee & Jeroen Luyten, Estimated Research and
Development Investment Needed To Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 JAMA 844,
851 (2020).
66. 21st Century Cures Act § 3033, 21 U.S.C. § 356. The Cures Act provides for several other
expedited review pathways. A manufacturer that develops a drug to treat “harm from a biological,
chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent” can receive priority review on another, unrelated drug
that uses an active ingredient never before approved by the FDA. Id. § 3086, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–
4a. The Cures Act also provides for approval of antibacterial or antifungal drugs based only on
limited population data. Id. § 3042, 21 U.S.C. § 356.
67. See id. § 3012, 21 U.S.C. § 360ff–1(a) (noting that the Cures Act’s section on the
development of drugs for rare diseases is intended to “facilitate the development, review, and
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real-world evidence, which is broadly defined as any “data regarding
the usage, or the potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from
sources other than randomized clinical trials,”68 such as electronic
health records and patient reports.69 The FDA may also evaluate a
drug’s safety and efficacy based on surrogate endpoints.70 These are not
“direct measurement[s] of clinical benefit.”71 Rather, they are
laboratory or imaging measures, such as antibody levels, blood
pressure, and response rates,72 that are “known . . . or . . . reasonably
likely to predict clinical benefit.”73
Real-world evidence and surrogate endpoints often require less
time and money to collect than traditional clinical outcome data.74 With
these alternative measures, the FDA also has greater flexibility to
approve drugs for conditions that have small patient populations.75
Manufacturers of these rare disease drugs might otherwise struggle to
enroll enough participants in traditional phase III trials based on
clinical outcomes to generate statistically significant safety and efficacy
data that can justify FDA approval.76

approval of genetically targeted drugs” and “maximize the use of scientific tools or methods,
including surrogate endpoints and other biomarkers”); id. § 3033(a)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(5)
(authorizing manufacturers “to discuss [with the FDA] any potential surrogate or intermediate
endpoint to be used to support the accelerated approval of an application”); id. § 3022, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355g(a) (noting that “[t]he Secretary [of health and human services] shall establish a program
to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” for satisfying approval and postapproval
requirements).
68. Id. § 3022, 21 U.S.C. § 355g(b).
69. Real-World Evidence, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/science-research/science-and-researchspecial-topics/real-world-evidence [https://perma.cc/4DZG-ZFVU], (last updated May 20, 2022).
For example, the Crohn’s and Colitis Foundation is collaborating with the FDA to gather patientreported data about symptoms, emergency room visits, and other developments in patient care.
Crohn’s & Colitis Foundation Selected for FDA MyStudies App Project, CROHN’S & COLITIS
FOUND. (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.crohnscolitisfoundation.org/news/crohns-colitis-found
ation-mystudies [https://perma.cc/4AAR-39Y7].
70. 21st Century Cures Act §§ 3011(a), 3012, 21 U.S.C. §§ 357, 360ff-1(a)(2).
71. Id. § 3011(a), 21 U.S.C. § 357(e)(9).
72. Table of Surrogate Endpoints That Were the Basis of Drug Approval or Licensure, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-resources/table-surrogate-endpoints-were-basis-drugapproval-or-licensure [https://perma.cc/3HYU-USYF], (last updated Feb. 28, 2022).
73. 21st Century Cures Act § 3011(a), 21 U.S.C. § 357(e)(9).
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. See Clarke et al., supra note 13 (describing the utility of using surrogate endpoints instead
of overall survival in non-small-cell lung cancer trials when overall survival data is difficult to
obtain and when the sample population is small).
76. YAN WANG, FDA, TRIAL DESIGN AND STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RARE
DISEASE CLINICAL T RIALS 6 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/131882/download [https://
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Despite their efficiency, surrogate endpoints and real-world
evidence often weakly predict a drug’s ultimate effect on clinical
outcomes in diverse patient populations.77 Compared to trials based on
clinical outcomes, these measures tend to overstate a drug’s true safety
and efficacy.78 Accordingly, some of the safety and efficacy information
the FDA could have identified from traditional clinical outcome data
likely escapes preapproval review under the Cures Act’s alternative
review measures. This information instead surfaces when the drug is
on the market and being used by patients.79
Unlike the accelerated approval pathways that predate the Cures
Act, manufacturers with RMAT-designated drugs have greater
flexibility in fulfilling the FDA’s postapproval requirements—which
further contributes to postmarket uncertainty. Traditionally,
manufacturers of therapies that received accelerated approval are
required to conduct postapproval confirmatory trials to verify clinical
benefit.80 Under the RMAT designation, however, manufacturers
might be able to fulfill their postapproval requirements without having
to conduct traditional clinical trials: the Cures Act authorizes the
perma.cc/8779-X4DY] (“Many rare disease trials have low power to demonstrate statistically
significant results due to small sample size or small treatment effect . . . .” (italics omitted)).
77. See Goble, supra note 17 (“While clinical trials typically enroll a relatively healthy
homogeneous population, postmarket drug use occurs in heterogeneous populations having
previously excluded comorbidities and reflect larger numbers of patients. This variability could
decrease the correlation between the surrogate endpoint and other endpoints in the real world.”);
id. at 679 (“Concerns with the use of [real-world evidence] for drug approvals . . . stem from the
relatively large number of assumptions necessary to analyze nonrandomized observational
data.”); see, e.g., Vinay Prasad, Chul Kim, Mauricio Burotto & Andrae Vandross, The Strength of
Association Between Surrogate End Points and Survival in Oncology: A Systematic Review of
Trial-Level Meta-Analyses, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1389, 1389 (2015) (finding from a metaanalysis that 52 percent of surrogate endpoints used in oncology studies were only weakly
correlated with survival).
78. See Ciani et al., supra note 19, at 490 (describing a study that “found that trials that used
surrogate end points were twice as likely to report positive treatment effects as trials that used
final outcomes” and another that found that “trials with primary end points that were surrogates
were more likely to report a positive treatment effect . . . than trials that reported final patientrelevant primary outcomes”); Goble, supra note 17, at 679 (noting that “[real-world evidence] can
lead to overemphasis of treatment benefits”). Despite some limitations, the standard clinical trial
measure of “overall survival . . . remains the gold-standard metric of benefit for [drugs].” Clarke
et al., supra note 13, at 804.
79. See, e.g., supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (describing possible postmarket
adverse effects from Aduhelm).
80. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2021) (“Approval under this section will be subject to the
requirement that the applicant study the drug further, to verify and describe its clinical benefit,
where there is uncertainty as to the relation of the surrogate endpoint to clinical benefit, or of the
observed clinical benefit to ultimate outcome.”); id. § 601.41 (same for “biological products,” or
biologics).
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secretary of health and human services to instead promulgate
regulations requiring only postapproval patient monitoring.81 Without
traditional postapproval clinical studies, manufacturers with drugs
approved under the Cures Act are more likely to rely on postmarket
adverse event reporting from patients to identify safety and efficacy
issues.
II. PROBLEMS WITH SHIFTING SAFETY AND EFFICACY DISCOVERY
TO THE POSTMARKET PHASE
The Cures Act fails to address two prominent effects of shifting
the discovery of safety and efficacy data to the postmarket phase
without giving the FDA a new role in postmarket oversight. First, this
shift interacts with the labeling rules to frustrate the FDA’s ability to
compel and assess postmarket safety and efficacy information. This gap
in postmarket oversight should be remedied by strengthening the
FDA’s ability to gather and assess postmarket drug information.
Second, by shifting safety and efficacy discoveries to the postmarket
phase, the Cures Act raises the risk of postmarket liability for
manufacturers and thus counterproductively raises the cost of
innovation. This should be remedied by decreasing the circumstances
under which manufacturers can be held liable.
A. The FDA Lacks a Necessary Role in Postmarket Oversight
Despite shifting safety and efficacy discovery to the postmarket
phase, the Cures Act does not correspondingly shift the FDA’s role in
gathering and evaluating that information. This is problematic, as the
postmarket phase is precisely where the FDA’s authority is weakest.82
When the FDA identifies an adverse event before approval, it can
more easily compel the manufacturer to provide additional
information and “require [FDA] reviewers to rerun data analyses.”83
Based on its findings, the FDA can then deny approval outright or
require the manufacturer to take certain postmarket risk-mitigating

81. 21st Century Cures Act § 3033(a)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(7).
82. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007) (“The most effective regulatory power that the
FDA has over the pharmaceutical industry is its premarket approval authority . . . .”); Darrow et
al., supra note 9, at 172 (“Because the FDA’s influence is weaker after a drug has been approved,
the rate of completion of [postmarket] studies is inadequate.”).
83. See Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production,
Past and Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2358 (2018).
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steps.84 The FDA is more limited, and often less effective, in its ability
to compel manufacturers to generate and disclose postmarket safety
and efficacy information. Although it can and does require
manufacturers to report certain adverse events85 and conduct
postmarket studies,86 it has historically been unsuccessful at ensuring
that those adverse event reports and studies are thorough and timely.87
Moreover, manufacturers lack the proper incentives to generate
and report postmarket information about their drugs in a consistent
and meaningful way—that is, in a way that would allow the FDA to
validate the information before the manufacturer acts on it.88
Manufacturers’ disclosure decisions are strongly influenced by two
sometimes contradictory postmarket incentives: avoiding losses in

84. See Development & Approval Process: Drugs, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/develop
ment-approval-process-drugs [https://perma.cc/RZF7-5LF3], (last updated Aug. 8, 2022)
(outlining the general requirements for approval and noting that the FDA may require the
manufacturer to implement “a Risk Management and Mitigation Strategy” to reduce risk
postmarket).
85. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2021) (describing manufacturers’ requirements for reporting adverse
drug experiences); id. § 600.80 (describing manufacturers’ requirements for reporting adverse
experiences involving biologics).
86. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (authorizing the secretary of health and human services
to require postmarket studies or clinical trials).
87. See Darrow et al., supra note 9, at 172 (“[A] study of 614 postapproval requirements and
commitments imposed in 2009 and 2010 found that by the end of 2015, 20% (125/614) had not
been started, 25% (156/614) were delayed or ongoing, and only 54% (333/614) were completed.”);
Marie R. Griffin, C. Michael Stein & Wayne A. Ray, Postmarketing Surveillance for Drug Safety:
Surely We Can Do Better, 75 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 491, 492 (2004)
(noting that “[d]elayed recognition of the importance of an adverse event is not a theoretic
concern” and describing, as an example, the delayed discovery of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs’ causal role in peptic ulcer disease); Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2381–82 (citing Huseyin
Naci, Katelyn R. Smalley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Characteristics of Preapproval and
Postapproval Studies for Drugs Granted Accelerated Approval by the US Food and Drug
Administration, 318 JAMA 626, 626 (2017)); see also Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Are Slow To
Prove Medicines That Got a Fast Track to Market Really Work, NPR (July 22, 2022, 12:44 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2022/07/22/1110830985/drugmakers-are-slow-to-prove
-medicines-that-got-a-fast-track-to-market-really-wo [https://perma.cc/V5XR-P7MC] (“NPR analyzed
30 years of FDA and National Institutes of Health data and found that 42% of currently
outstanding confirmatory studies, or 50 of them, either took more than a year to begin following
accelerated approval or hadn’t started at all.”); Charles Piller, FDA and NIH Let Clinical Trial
Sponsors Keep Results Secret and Break the Law, SCI.: SCIENCEINSIDER (Jan. 13, 2020), https:/
/www.science.org/content/article/fda-and-nih-let-clinical-trial-sponsors-keep-results-secret-andbreak-law [https://perma.cc/A4H2-S97T] (noting that despite requirements to report clinical trial
results in a federal database, many “companies, universities, and other institutions” do not
comply).
88. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2373 (explaining the FDA’s role is best understood
“not [as] making choices for [patients] . . . but [as] generating and validating information about
medicines” (emphasis omitted)).

ENGLE IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

876

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/16/2022 10:45 AM

[Vol. 72:861

sales and avoiding liability. The relative weight of these incentives
remains open to study. Regardless of which incentive dominates for a
particular manufacturer, the effect is to compromise the FDA’s role in
forcing and promptly assessing drug information.
On the one hand, manufacturers may face financial incentives to
withhold postmarket information and delay label changes when public
reporting could generate bad publicity, decrease healthcare payers’
willingness to pay, and cause a drop in sales.89 For example, evidence
suggests that Merck90 had long known that its blockbuster drug Vioxx
caused heart damage.91 But instead of seeking a label change or
withdrawing the drug from the market, Merck concealed the adverse
safety information from the FDA.92 Without relevant information from
the manufacturer, the FDA did not know to take appropriate
preventative action, such as requiring additional warnings93 or
withdrawing approval of Vioxx,94 to prevent any of the estimated
thirty-eight thousand deaths from Vioxx-related heart damage.95
On the other hand, manufacturers face incentives under the
FDA’s current postmarket brand-name drug labeling rules to reduce
their liability risk by pursuing qualifying unilateral label changes.96
89. See Griffin et al., supra note 87, at 492 (“There are strong disincentives for companies or
contract research organizations to identify safety problems with licensed drugs quickly and
efficiently. . . . [S]eeking out and sharing bad news about a product are unlikely to increase
business.”); Anna Kaplan, Biogen CEO Stepping Down After Struggles with Alzheimer’s Drug
Aduhelm, FORBES (May 4, 2022, 4:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annakaplan/2022/05/03/
biogen-ceo-stepping-down-after-struggles-with-alzheimers-drug-aduhelm [https://perma.cc/YD
4Y-XMW7] (describing Biogen’s decision “to cut about $1 billion in costs annually . . . after
Medicare limited coverage for its Alzheimer’s drug, Aduhelm”).
90. Merck is a biopharmaceutical company. See About Our Company, MERCK, https://
www.merck.com/company-overview [https://perma.cc/FC3R-L4HG].
91. See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Failing in Drug Safety, Official Asserts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/business/fda-failing-in-drug-safety-official-ass
erts.html [https://perma.cc/9L8L-TBRR] (discussing internal Merck conversations that may
indicate that Merck knew of Vioxx’s propensity to cause heart damage before it became public
knowledge). At its peak, Vioxx generated $2.5 billion in annual revenue for Merck. Merck’s Profit
Slammed by Charge, Vioxx, NBC (July 21, 2005, 9:29 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/
wbna8656235 [https://perma.cc/47WC-6GYU].
92. Id.
93. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (authorizing the FDA to require certain label changes).
94. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2021) (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval of a drug);
id. § 601.43 (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval of a biologic).
95. Snigdha Prakash & Vikki Valentine, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Vioxx, NPR (Nov.
10, 2007, 2:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2007/11/10/5470430/timeline-the-rise-and-fall-of-vioxx
[https://perma.cc/52V3-BHKD].
96. Scholars have previously addressed how “[p]otential tort liability . . . give[s] companies
incentives to monitor and report adverse events.” See Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort
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Under the Court’s reasoning in Wyeth v. Levine,97 patients who are
allegedly injured by a drug can sue a manufacturer for failing to change
its label under the FDA’s Changes Being Effected (“CBE-0”) rule to
warn of the risk.98 This labeling pathway is available for manufacturers
to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction” to “reflect newly acquired information,”99 which
includes “new analyses of previously submitted data” that “reveal risks
of a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously
included in submissions to FDA.”100 The manufacturer must submit to
the FDA a CBE-0 supplement describing the proposed change.101 Once
the FDA receives the supplement, the manufacturer can change its
label.102 For manufacturers, the cost of failure-to-warn suits has
reached the billions.103 When the risk of liability outweighs the risk of
commercial loss from publicly disclosing the adverse event,
manufacturers will report the postmarket information to the extent
required in the CBE-0 supplement to make unilateral label changes.
Although these unilateral changes require some limited
disclosures to the FDA,104 they prevent the FDA from evaluating that

System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 2 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 587, 602 (2005). Label changes are one additional way that manufacturers
can try to reduce their risk of being sued for failing to warn.
97. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
98. Id. at 571 (holding that the drug manufacturer Wyeth “had a duty to provide a warning
that adequately described that risk, and the CBE regulation permitted it to provide such a warning
before receiving the FDA’s approval”). Courts will not entertain these failure-to-warn suits if
there is “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug’s] label.”
Id.
99. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2021).
100. “Newly acquired information” is
data, analyses, or other information not previously submitted to the [FDA], which may
include . . . data derived from new clinical studies, reports of adverse events, or new
analyses of previously submitted data . . . [if they] reveal risks of a different type or
greater severity or frequency than previously included in submissions to FDA.
Id. § 314.3(b).
101. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (c)(3).
102. Id. § 314.70(c)(6).
103. See, e.g., Lewis Krauskopf, Merck Agrees To Pay $4.85 Billion in Vioxx Settlement,
REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2007, 4:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-merck-vioxx-settlement/
merck-agrees-to-pay-4-85-billion-in-vioxx-settlement-idUSL0929726620071109 [https://per
ma.cc/S553-HCU7] (noting that the parties settled for $4.85 billion); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at
562 (noting that the damage award was $7.4 million before reductions).
104. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3)(i)–(vii) (2021) (describing the information that the
manufacturer must include in its CBE supplement, including “[a] detailed description of the
proposed change;” “[a] description of the methods used and studies performed to assess the
effects of the change;” and “[t]he data derived from such studies”).
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information or compelling manufacturers to produce additional
information before the label changes are made. The manufacturer
effectuates the label change before the FDA can review it.105 The FDA
is left only with the authority to later reject the change,106 likely after
the new label has reached doctors and their patients. These unilateral
changes thus frustrate the FDA’s key role in assessing and acting on
safety and efficacy information in the first instance.
Manufacturers sometimes consult informally with the FDA before
initiating a label change,107 but Wyeth’s progeny could reduce
manufacturers’ incentives to do so. The Wyeth Court had held that
state failure-to-warn claims are preempted by the FDA’s drug labeling
authority under the FDCA only if there is “clear evidence that the
FDA would not have approved [the] change to [the drug’s] label.”108 In
part, it reasoned that if there is no clear evidence that the FDA would
reject the label change required by state law, then federal law did not
make it impossible for the manufacturer to comply simultaneously with
the FDA’s authority under the FDCA and its obligation under state
law to modify its label.109 In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht,110
the Court clarified that Wyeth’s clear evidence standard is met only
when the manufacturer has “show[n] that it fully informed the FDA of
the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the
FDA, in turn,” rejected the label change.111 Although “[t]he question
of disapproval ‘method’” was not before the Court, it nonetheless
noted that this rejection must be in the form of “agency action[] taken
pursuant to the FDA’s congressionally delegated authority.”112 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the FDA
must take “final agency action.”113 Conversations with the FDA in
which the FDA informally expresses its disapproval might not suffice
to protect manufacturers from failure-to-warn liability following

105. See id. § 314.70(c)(6) (noting that the manufacturer “may commence distribution of the
drug product involved upon receipt by the agency of [the] supplement”); see also id. § 601.12(c)(5)
(noting the same for biologics).
106. Id. §§ 314.70(c)(7), 601.12(c)(6).
107. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 561–62 (noting prior “correspondence between Wyeth and the
FDA discussing Phenergan’s label” and intra-arterial injection, the risk at issue in the lawsuit).
108. Id. at 571.
109. Id.
110. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
111. Id. at 1678.
112. Id. at 1679.
113. Id. at 1683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Merck.114 Thus, in light of this uncertainty after Merck, manufacturers
might sometimes choose to forgo informal consultations with the FDA
and instead file CBE-0 supplements, hoping for the FDA to quickly
and formally reject the change.
The magnitude of these various disclosure-distorting incentives is
particularly great after the Cures Act. Manufacturers may face
extremely high costs to develop treatments contemplated by the Cures
Act, such as gene therapies.115 Moreover, the market for these drugs is
small; often only a few hundred or a few thousand people are eligible
to take the drug.116 Therefore, these manufacturers could face higherthan-normal incentives to withhold adverse information that could
deter patients and insurers from paying for their products.
Additionally, because the Cures Act raises the risk that adverse drug
events will not arise until the postmarket phase,117 manufacturers
seeking drug approval under the Cures Act could also face a substantial
risk of postmarket failure-to-warn liability. Manufacturers that
develop drugs for rare diseases face these high upfront costs and
liability risks in addition to small patient populations from which they
might struggle to recoup their development expenses.118 These costs
could intensify manufacturers’ incentives either to suppress adverse
information or to unilaterally modify their labels to limit their liability
exposure.119

114. See id. (noting that “the [FDA’s] letter was not a final agency action with the force of
law, so it” could not preempt the state tort claim).
115. See Rich Durante, Solving the Gene Therapy Cost-Effectiveness Conundrum (Jan. 6,
2020), https://www.marugroup.net/insights/blog/gene-therapy-cost-effectiveness [https://per
ma.cc/H26B-6GB7] (discussing the financial challenges of developing gene therapies).
116. Emily Mullin, Tracking the Cost of Gene Therapy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/10/24/148183/tracking-the-cost-of-gene-therapy [https://
perma.cc/7YPG-VKXF].
117. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
118. See Steven Simoens, Pricing and Reimbursement of Orphan Drugs: The Need for More
Transparency, 6 ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES, no. 42, 2011, at 3 (noting that “in the case of
[some] orphan drugs, these R&D costs need to be recouped from a small number of patients” and
that manufacturers that do bring these drugs to market might raise costs for patients); cf. EY,
IMPACT OF THE ORPHAN DRUG TAX CREDIT ON TREATMENTS FOR RARE DISEASES 1 (2015),
https://rarediseases.org/assets/files/white-papers/2015-06-17.nord-bio-ey-odtc.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/WU7K-US6R] (noting that absent financial support from the Orphan Drug Tax Credit,
“drug developers were often hesitant to invest in developing new treatments for diseases with
small patient populations because these treatments offered limited potential to recover
development costs”).
119. See, e.g., Angus Liu, Biogen Starts Layoff Round as the Aduhelm Maker Struggles with
Alzheimer’s Rollout, FIERCE PHARMA (Mar. 3, 2022, 11:50 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma/biogen-starts-layoff-round-aduhelm-maker-struggles-alzheimers-rollout [https://per
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No matter their relative weight, these incentives to avoid market
loss and tort liability impede meaningful, timely disclosures from
manufacturers to the FDA. Following the Cures Act, changes should
be made to postmarket oversight that dampen these perverse
incentives and instead compel manufacturers to make timely
postmarket disclosures to the FDA.120
Currently, postmarket failure-to-warn liability fails to adequately
promote timely disclosures. Given that the FDA’s current postmarket
authority is weak, failure-to-warn lawsuits have historically served to
force manufacturers to reveal important safety and efficacy
information.121 However, disclosures compelled by courts in failure-towarn suits come too late. Once a failure-to-warn suit has materialized,
a substantial number of patients have often already been harmed.122
Moreover, these suits are sometimes filed after the drug is withdrawn
from the market by the manufacturer or approval is withdrawn by the
FDA.123 Accordingly, the key safety information has likely already
been revealed. The failure-to-warn lawsuit was not needed to prompt
that disclosure. The Vioxx scandal of the early 2000s underscores that
failure-to-warn suits might not facilitate the types of disclosures that
allow the FDA to prevent harm, even if the suits serve a valuable
compensatory function. After Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market
in 2004,124 it faced a series of failure-to-warn lawsuits filed by patients

ma.cc/QHW5-98B5] (describing Biogen’s $500 million cost-savings plan in response to Aduhelm’s
uncertain start after FDA approval).
120. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2381–82 (making the argument for timely and sufficient
drug studies). Although Professor Amy Kapczynski also expresses concern that the Cures Act
has threatened the FDA’s information-forcing role, id. at 2379–82, this Note goes further to argue
that this interference is worsened by the current postmarket labeling rules and other perverse
market incentives affecting manufacturers. Whereas Professor Kapczynski argues that the FDA
should respond by “requir[ing] rigorous follow-on studies,” id. at 2381, this Note takes a more
indirect approach and proposes a change to the labeling rules to align manufacturers’ disclosure
incentives with those of the FDA, at least as to drug safety data, see infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 91 (noting that Merck disclosed various documents about
Vioxx’s safety issues during the litigation).
122. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2365 (noting that “incentives to disclose negative
information . . . operate ex post”).
123. See Kristin Compton, Vioxx Lawsuits, DRUGWATCH, https://www.drugwatch.com/vioxx/
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/PJ9A-KPXN], (last updated Sept. 9, 2022) (“Following the Vioxx recall,
Merck was hit with a flood of lawsuits by patients and family members of patients who said they
had suffered heart attacks and strokes because of the drug.”).
124. Associated Press, Merck Announces Withdrawal of Vioxx Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/30/business/merck-announces-withdrawal-of-vioxxpainkiller.html [https://perma.cc/C3P9-RDKB].
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who had taken Vioxx.125 But by then, an estimated thirty-eight
thousand patients had already died from heart attacks caused by the
drug.126 Merck settled the cases for over $4 billion, and Vioxx remained
off the market.127 As this situation suggests, when manufacturers
disclose critical safety information only after substantial harm has
occurred and the drug has been withdrawn from the market, the FDA
can no longer act ex ante to prevent that harm from occurring,128 such
as by requiring a warning129 or withdrawing approval of the drug.130 The
FDA can only act on newly revealed information—if any—to reduce
harm moving forward.
With early disclosures from manufacturers, the FDA ideally can
act before harm is widespread. Additionally, the FDA alone has the
authority to access all private and public studies on a drug’s safety and
efficacy, reflecting the full range of recorded harms and benefits.131 So
long as the manufacturer properly discloses its postmarket
information, the FDA has the full range of data with which to weigh
the drug’s safety risks against its efficacy in deciding how to respond to
a particular risk.132
Drugs approved under the Cures Act can be high risk, high
reward: as with Breyanzi, the treatment might cure some patients but
significantly harm others, and there are often no other, safer options
on the market.133 Accordingly, the tradeoff between harms and benefits
might be a close call. Thus, the need for balanced information on both
harms and benefits could be particularly great. Focusing on harms to
the exclusion of substantial efficacy benefits, as might occur in a
failure-to-warn lawsuit, could lead to overwarning of a particular
125. Compton, supra note 123.
126. Prakash & Valentine, supra note 95.
127. See Krauskopf, supra note 103 (noting that the settlement amount was $4.85 billion).
128. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2365 (noting that “incentives to disclose negative
information . . . operate ex post”).
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (authorizing the FDA to require certain label changes).
130. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2021) (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval of a drug); id.
§ 601.43 (same for a biologic).
131. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2368 (noting that this access is not available to private
third parties).
132. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1449
(1994) (noting that without “perfect information about both the costs of accidents and the costs
of avoiding them . . . the tort system cannot reliably determine where compensation should be
awarded in order to maximize social welfare, . . . thereby harming social welfare by reducing
overall efficiency”).
133. See supra notes 3–7, 24–26 and accompanying text.
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risk.134 This could generate unwarranted concern among patients and
impede uptake of net-beneficial treatment.135
The opposite is also true. If disclosures are disproportionately
focused on benefits, patients might unreasonably be encouraged to
take a drug despite the risk of substantial harm. Compared to the
current system of ex post liability and data production, early
disclosures from manufacturers combined with the FDA’s wide data
access could better prevent harms from imbalanced disclosures.136 The
interests of patients and the goals of the Cures Act are thus best served
by compelling manufacturers to make timely, comprehensive
disclosures to the FDA.
In sum, the Cures Act fails to give the FDA a role in postmarket
oversight, and manufacturers’ postmarket incentives are doing nothing
to fill that gap. Currently, the FDA’s unique role in compelling,
evaluating, and acting on drug information is partially supplanted by
the manufacturer, who enacts the label change unilaterally, or by
courts in the event of a lawsuit. The current labeling rules contribute
to this issue by impeding meaningful disclosures that would allow the
FDA to gather and assess safety and efficacy data in the first instance.
These rules should be changed to instead motivate meaningful
disclosures to the FDA when safety and efficacy information arises
during the postmarket phase.
B. Current Labeling Rules May Deter Beneficial Innovation
The Cures Act and the current drug labeling rules also incidentally
increase the possibility of postmarket liability and thus the cost of
134. Cf. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“A jury . . . sees only the cost of a more
dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits
are not represented in court.”).
135. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601
(2021)) (“Overwarning, just like underwarning, can similarly have a negative effect on patient
safety and public health.”).
136. Those who fear that the FDA is a captured agency might argue that giving the FDA a
new postmarket role could exacerbate these effects. However, the FDA’s role in weighing safety
and efficacy to approve and regulate medicines necessarily involves “balanc[ing] normative
considerations about speed and certainty in light of disease severity and medical need,” and
making decisions about these resource allocations unavoidably implicates political “value
judgments about competing goods and interests.” Holly Fernandez Lynch, Steven Joffe &
Matthew S. McCoy, The Limits of Acceptable Political Influence over the FDA, 27 NATURE MED.
188, 189 (2021). As Part III acknowledges, Congress retains the authority to define the scope of
the FDA’s authority and thus influence the FDA’s strength and agenda. See infra notes 176, 233–
234 and accompanying text.
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innovation. Because surrogate endpoints and real-world evidence can
fail to accurately predict a drug’s clinical outcomes,137 manufacturers
face a greater risk of postmarket adverse events and a heightened risk
of failure-to-warn liability under Wyeth.138 Given that settlement
amounts and damage awards from failure-to-warn suits have
historically been high, the manufacturer’s ultimate liability could
exceed any cost savings from expedited approval under the Cures
Act.139 Although liability risk and its associated costs might favorably
deter manufacturers from marketing high-risk, low-efficacy drugs, it
might also counterproductively deter manufacturers from innovating
and relying on the Cures Act for potentially lifesaving treatments.140
Smaller manufacturers141 are increasingly responsible for modern
drug innovation142 but are also the manufacturers that could be most
137. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
138. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 559–63, 569–81 (2009) (affirming the finding of
liability against Wyeth for failing to warn adequately of the risks of arterial injection of
Phenergan).
139. Compare Krauskopf, supra note 103 (discussing Merck’s $4.85 billion Vioxx settlement),
with Moore et al., supra note 60 (noting that the average cost of trials based on clinical outcome
data was $64.7 million).
140. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development,
and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 164 (1993) (conducting an empirical analysis of product
R&D intensity and product liability costs and finding that “[a]t high levels of liability costs,
liability reduces innovative activity”); Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic
Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and
Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 273 (2013) (“[T]he risk of significant noneconomic damage
payments may result in manufacturers curbing innovation or production to reduce their exposure
to catastrophic judgments.”).
141. The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) defines small drug manufacturers as “those
with annual revenues of less than $500 million,” while large manufacturers are “those with annual
revenues of $1 billion or more.” DAVID AUSTIN & TAMARA HAYFORD, CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 4 box 1 (2021), https://
www.cbo.gov/publication/57126 [https://perma.cc/8BJT-8QLM]. However, the information
technology company IQVIA defines companies with less than $500 million in revenue as
“emerging biopharma” and those with between $500 million and $5 billion as “small.” MURRAY
AITKEN, MICHAEL KLEINROCK, DEANNA NASS & ALANA SIMORELLIS, IQVIA INST. FOR HUM.
DATA SCI., THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: INNOVATION,
DRIVERS OF CHANGE, AND EVOLUTION OF CLINICAL TRIAL PRODUCTIVITY 10 (2019), https://
www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/the-changing-landscape-of-research-anddevelopment.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ28-8N7M].
142. See AUSTIN & HAYFORD, supra note 141 (noting that “[s]mall drug companies . . . now
account for more than 70 percent of the nearly 3,000 drugs in phase III clinical trials” and that
“[s]ince 2009, about one-third of the new drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration
have been developed by pharmaceutical firms with annual revenues of less than $100 million”);
Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016, 1:30 PM),
https://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups [https://perma.cc/M8KQ-MNM8] (noting
that smaller manufacturers were “increasingly . . . generat[ing] the lion’s share of innovative
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deterred by the heightened risk of postmarket liability after the Cures
Act. Relative to larger manufacturers, smaller manufacturers possess a
comparative advantage in drug innovation. Small manufacturers
typically dedicate a larger portion of their spending to researching new
drugs, whereas larger manufacturers typically focus on conducting
clinical trials or improving their existing drugs.143 Additionally, small
manufacturers often have “more dynamic and flexible” research and
development programs that are more effective at developing
innovative therapies.144 Rather than licensing to or merging with larger
manufacturers, many of these small manufacturers are now bringing
their own drugs to market.145
Although smaller manufacturers’ near-singular focus on research
and development is a virtue in drug innovation, it is a potential
weakness in responding to the risk of postmarket liability. Compared
to their larger counterparts, smaller manufacturers generally have
fewer administrative resources146 and are less equipped to monitor
their drugs postmarket and respond to issues that arise.147 This may
make them particularly sensitive to postmarket liability risks. If these
risks are sufficiently great, they might disincentivize small
manufacturers from incurring the upfront costs necessary to develop
lifesaving drugs and bring them to market quickly under the Cures Act.
At the time of this publication, the Cures Act’s precise effects on
small manufacturers are still unfolding. Yet, two recent examples
suggest that manufacturers’ drug development decisions can be
drugs. The shift is further fueled by rapid consolidation among the giants, shake-ups inside R&D
departments, and succession planning inside big companies”).
143. AUSTIN & HAYFORD, supra note 141, at 3.
144. MARK STEEDMAN, KAREN TAYLOR, MARK STOCKBRIDGE, MARIA JOÃO CRUZ,
SONAL SHAH & WENDELL MIRANDA, DELOITTE, TEN YEARS ON MEASURING THE RETURN
FROM PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 2019, at 7 fig.1 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/deloitte-uk-ten-years-onmeasur ing-return-on-pharma-innovation-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HAJ-SPQT].
145. See AITKEN ET AL., supra note 141 (“An increasing percentage of recent launches have
originated with [companies with revenues of less than $500 million or R&D spending of less than
$200 million].”); see also id. (“The dynamics of development, M&A and licensing activity seem to
be shifting, and [companies with revenues of less than $500 million or R&D spending of less than
$200 million] are retaining control of their assets to a greater degree.”).
146. AUSTIN & HAYFORD, supra note 141.
147. Cf. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Jeremy A. Greene, Risk, Responsibility, and
Generic Drugs, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1679, 1680 (2012) (noting that, in the context of genericdrug manufacturers, “[i]mposing vague liability and postmarketing surveillance responsibilities
on large numbers of generic-drug manufacturers, many of them small companies that are illprepared to undertake such surveillance, may be ineffective in generating sufficient knowledge
about drug safety”).
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adversely affected by market uncertainty and liability and might
benefit from liability protection.
Moderna’s development of the COVID-19 vaccine suggests the
potential pro-innovation benefits of protecting manufacturers from
liability through preemptive safe harbors. Before the release of its
mRNA COVID-19 vaccine in 2020,148 Moderna was a smaller149 and
financially unstable company.150 Money was dwindling, and Moderna
needed an injection of capital to produce its vaccine.151 Only after
Morgan Stanley purchased $1.34 billion of Moderna’s shares in May
2020 could Moderna invest in the necessary production equipment.152
Additionally, in early 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services had declared that the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP”) shielded COVID-19 vaccine
manufacturers from most liability, including failure-to-warn claims.153
As an increasingly skeptical public154 watched the list of vaccine side

148. FDA Takes Additional Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use
Authorization for Second COVID-19 Vaccine, FDA (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emerg
ency-use-authorization-second-covid [https://perma.cc/UG8K-A8K4].
149. See Fraiser Kansteiner, Moderna, After Monumental Commercial Debut, Forecasts $22B
in COVID Shot Sales This Year, FIERCE PHARMA (Feb. 24, 2022, 9:55 AM), https://www.
fiercepharma.com/pharma/moderna-18-5b-bank-forecasts-22b-2022-covid-shot-sales [https://
perma.cc/B2FB-4X4F] (noting that Moderna generated $803 million in revenue in 2020).
Moderna’s 2020 revenue puts it slightly over CBO’s threshold for small drug companies but within
the threshold set by IQVIA. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150. Gregory Zuckerman, How Moderna Nearly Lost the Race To Develop a Covid-19
Vaccine, STAT (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/10/26/how-moderna-nearly-lostthe-race-to-develop-a-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/CR28-A2J4].
151. Id.
152. Id.; Moderna Announces Pricing of Public Offering of Shares of Common Stock, BUS.
WIRE (May 18, 2020, 10:32 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200518005788/en
[https://perma.cc/RV8Y-Q6LA].
153. Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical
Countermeasures Against COVID–19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198, 15,201 (Mar. 17, 2020); see also
Expanding Access to Covid-19 Therapeutics, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH: PUB. HEALTH
EMERGENCY, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/prepact/Pages/PREPact-NinethAmend
ment.aspx [https://perma.cc/FR3U-5WMC], (last updated Sept. 21, 2021) (discussing the impact
of the PREP Act declaration).
154. See, e.g., BELLINDA K. SCHOOF, GRETCHEN LASALLE, EUGENE SCHIFF & MICHELE Q.
ZAWORA, AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS, SURVEYING THE EFFECT OF THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC ON PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN VACCINES AND VACCINE MESSENGERS 5 (2021), https:/
/www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/patient_care/immunizations/vaccine-survey-pandemic.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8GDN-5XJ4] (finding that 20.8 percent of survey respondents felt less
confident in vaccines since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic); Alec Tyson, Courtney Johnson
& Cary Funk, U.S. Public Now Divided Over Whether To Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-divided-

ENGLE IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

886

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/16/2022 10:45 AM

[Vol. 72:861

effects grow,155 the PREP safe harbor protected Moderna and other
manufacturers from otherwise fertile ground for failure-to-warn
liability.156 Operating alongside other incentives,157 the safe harbor
helped Moderna expand its production and lower its costs.158
The exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic notwithstanding,
Moderna’s vaccine development offers two lessons. First, Moderna’s
early financial constraints suggest that even a manufacturer with a
promising drug may struggle to overcome the high costs of bringing it
to market.159 The cost of testing or producing the drug might be too
high,160 and for rare disease drugs, the patient population might be too
small for the manufacturer to recover expenses.161 The risk of

over-whether-to-get-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/M2DP-BJ4J] (“Intent to get a COVID19 vaccine has fallen from 72% in May [2020 to 51% in September], a 21 percentage point drop.”).
155. See, e.g., Shawn Radcliffe, FDA Is Reportedly Looking Again at Heart Inflammation
Linked to Moderna Vaccine, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.healthline.com/healthnews/fda-to-add-warning-on-mrna-covid-19-vaccines-about-rare-heart-related-side-effect [https:
//perma.cc/52YG-GAX2] (noting that reports suggested that Moderna raised the risk of heart
inflammation in young adults); Overview of COVID-19 Vaccines, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/Moderna.html [https://perma.cc/A9SK-UAKK],
(last updated Sept. 2, 2022) (noting that people may experience “fever, chills, tiredness, and
headache”).
156. Cf. Ian Lopez & Jacquie Lee, J&J Vaccine Liability Shield a Boon Despite Rare Blood
Clots (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 14, 2021, 5:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-lawand-business/j-j-vaccine-liability-shield-a-boon-despite-rare-blood-clots [https://perma.cc/BL3XAK7V] (“Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca plc, and other Covid-19 vaccine makers are shielded
from liability for adverse effects on recipients, and attorneys say the protections are a boon for
medical innovation that’s critical to combating the pandemic.”).
157. By purchasing large quantities of COVID-19 vaccines, the government bolstered
demand for vaccines, reduced market risk to manufacturers, and incentivized manufacturers to
“devot[e] firm resources to the vaccine effort.” Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach & Nicole Lurie, It
Was the Government That Produced COVID-19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFFS. (May 14, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210512.191448 [https://perma.cc/XT6F-76NT]
(noting that the federal government purchased three hundred million doses of Moderna’s
COVID-19 vaccine for $4.95 billion).
158. MacKenzie Sigalos, You Can’t Sue Pfizer or Moderna If You Have Severe Covid Vaccine
Side Effects. The Government Likely Won’t Compensate You for Damages Either, CNBC (Dec.
23, 2020, 12:32 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/16/covid-vaccine-side-effects-compensationlawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/4C77-FLN5] (explaining that the safe harbor incentivized the
manufacturers to produce large quantities of vaccines and noting that it “guard[s] [the
manufacturers] against lawsuits” and “helps lower the cost of the immunizations”).
159. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
160. See Matthew J. Ferris, Kai Sun, Corey Savard, Tejas Suresh & Mark V. Mishra, Factors
Related to Small- and Mid-Capitalization Pharmaceutical Company Success Using Stock
Performance as a Surrogate, 13 CUREUS, no. e18210, 2021, at 1 (“Developing novel
pharmaceuticals demands substantial investment despite high uncertainty of success and ultimate
market value. . . . [M]uch of new drug innovation[ is] a very high-risk, high-reward gambit . . . .”).
161. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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postmarket liability is an additional and, after the Cures Act,
potentially substantial cost that makes the initial investment in drug
development even riskier.162 To the extent that this risk exceeds the
cost savings from the Cures Act’s expedited, flexible review, it could
deter some small manufacturers from making initial investments in
beneficial drug development.163 Second, although the PREP safe
harbor was one of many factors affecting Moderna’s decisions, it
signals that the government can and has used safe harbors to reduce
postmarket uncertainty and incentivize drug production.164
Absent a preemptive safe harbor, manufacturers looking to
market a drug must prepare to absorb any potential liability exposure
arising from postmarket adverse events. Biogen’s reaction to
Aduhelm’s postmarket uncertainty offers a potential warning for
smaller manufacturers, even those that are developing less
controversial drugs.165 After a patient taking Aduhelm died from brain
abnormalities, industry analysts suggested that “more careful
labeling/monitoring” could be warranted if the death is later linked to
Aduhelm.166 Plaintiffs’ attorneys began advertising their services for
failure-to-warn litigation,167 and Biogen reached a meager $300,000 in
third-quarter sales in 2021.168 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services announced that Medicare would only cover Aduhelm for

162. See supra notes 137–84 and accompanying text.
163. See Wyeth v. Levine: “Tragic Facts Make Bad Law,” THOMPSON HINE (Mar. 12, 2009),
https://mobile.thompsonhine.com/publications/wyeth-v-levine-tragic-facts-make-bad-law [https:/
/perma.cc/L42D-EEV4] (noting that liability under Wyeth could “thwart efforts by
manufacturers, particularly smaller companies, to pursue the development of innovative drugs”).
164. See supra notes 153–158 and accompanying text.
165. Biogen’s 2021 revenue was $10.982 billion. BIOGEN, BIOGEN REPORTS FOURTH
QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2021 RESULTS 1 (2022), https://investors.biogen.com/static-files/
e483fbec-6adb-4bfd-a2c0-e48d488a3256 [https://perma.cc/F9ZU-KWRP]. Thus, Biogen is a large
pharmaceutical company by both the CBO’s and IQVIA’s metrics. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
166. Fraiser Kansteiner, Biogen’s Aduhelm ‘Likely’ Linked to Alzheimer’s Patient’s Death,
RBC Analyst Says, FIERCE PHARMA (Nov. 18, 2021, 2:56 PM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma/biogen-s-aduhelm-could-be-linked-to-alzheimer-s-patient-s-death-analyst-says [https://
perma.cc/GMX9-P575].
167. E.g., Biogen Aduhelm Lawsuit – Legal Claims for ARIA Causing Stroke, Seizure, or
Death, SHOUSE INJ. L. GRP., https://www.shouselaw.com/torts/aduhelm [https://perma.cc/2VBSCRJA], (last updated Jan. 13, 2022).
168. BIOGEN, BIOGEN REPORTS THIRD QUARTER 2021 RESULTS 1 (2021), https://
investors.biogen.com/static-files/4e5e45f7-9bd1-412a-a7f1-fc5366b2f3cd [https://perma.cc/P7J8S8XM].
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patients enrolled in qualifying clinical trials.169 Biogen subsequently
announced a $1 billion annual cost-savings plan.170 For scale, small
manufacturers typically have annual revenues of $500 million or less.171
Few drugs approved under the Cures Act have experienced the
same degree of controversy.172 But even for drugs with safety and
efficacy profiles that are stronger than Aduhelm’s,173 the imprecision
of some surrogate endpoints makes postmarket uncertainty and
liability an ever-present risk.174 To the extent that the magnitude of
Biogen’s cost cutting is representative, smaller manufacturers might be
unable to reduce costs by the amount necessary to prepare for potential
postmarket liability. Knowing that they might lack the financial
flexibility to weather postmarket uncertainty, smaller manufacturers
might hesitate before investing in novel drug development and
pursuing approval under the Cures Act’s flexible, expedited pathways.
This is counterproductive if it deters development of drugs that could
be highly effective for patients who are willing to assume some known
safety risks, as with Breyanzi.175
Together, Parts II.A and II.B suggest that two issues persist after
the Cures Act in light of the current labeling rules. First, the FDA is
without an important postmarket role in compelling and evaluating
drug safety and efficacy information. Second, manufacturers face a
heightened risk of liability that unpredictably raises their cost of drug
development, potentially deterring beneficial innovation. The labeling
rules that currently exacerbate these issues should instead be

169. TAMARA SYREK JENSEN, JOSEPH CHIN, JOANNA BALDWIN, ANDREW WARD, DAVID
DOLAN, KARYN KAI ANDERSON & JOSEPH DOLPH HUTTER, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., CAG-00460N, MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES DIRECTED AGAINST AMYLOID
FOR THE TREATMENT OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE pt. X (2022), https://www.cms.gov/medicarecoverage-database/view/ncacal-decision-memo.aspx?proposed=N&ncaid=305 [https://perma.cc/
B3QA-UTSH].
170. Anna Kaplan, Biogen CEO Stepping Down After Struggles with Alzheimer’s Drug
Aduhelm, FORBES (May 4, 2022, 4:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annakaplan/2022/05/03/
biogen-ceo-stepping-down-after-struggles-with-alzheimers-drug-aduhelm [https://perma.cc/YD
4Y-XMW7]; see also Liu, supra note 119 (describing an earlier cost-savings plan and noting that
it “was triggered by the [drug’s] bad reception . . . thanks to controversies around . . . [the drug’s]
efficacy and safety profile plus Biogen’s reportedly questionable interactions with the FDA in the
run up to the approval”).
171. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7, 24–26 and accompanying text (describing Breyanzi).
173. See supra notes 6–7, 24–26, 30–39 and accompanying text (describing Breyanzi and
Aduhelm).
174. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 6–7, 24–26 and accompanying text.
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transformed into a mechanism that both compels disclosure and
protects innovation.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: REVISED LABELING RULES AND
STRICTER FDCA ENFORCEMENT
This Part proposes that Congress amend section 506A of the
FDCA176 so that the FDA can revise its drug labeling rules to restrict
the availability of unilateral CBE-0 label changes and introduce a new
labeling pathway. I call this pathway CBE-60 for the sixty-day FDA
review it entails.177 Simultaneously, the FDA should intensify its

176. Section 506A of the FDCA grants the FDA authority to promulgate rules that govern
changes to NDAs and BLAs. Section 506A defines four reporting categories: major
manufacturing changes, changes not requiring supplemental application to the FDA, changes
requiring supplemental application to the FDA that the manufacturer can make immediately, and
changes requiring supplemental application to the FDA that the manufacturer can make after
thirty days. See FDCA § 506A, 21 U.S.C. § 356a. The FDA’s current labeling rules conform to
these categories. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 601.12 (2021) (defining the requirements for
label changes through a prior approval supplement, changes being effected, changes being
effected in thirty days, and changes to be described in an annual report).
177. My proposal notably differs from previously suggested and ultimately rejected changes
to the labeling rules. The first of these proposals was raised in 2014 by several pharmaceutical
groups. Letter from Ralph G. Neas, President & CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass’n, & John J.
Castellani, President & CEO, Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am., to Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r,
Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://secureservercdn.net/45.40.148.117/d3k.473.my
ftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EAR_letter_to_FDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZR38RCH]. Under that proposal, manufacturers could flag a submission to the FDA that contains
new information. Id. In response, the FDA would conduct an “Expedited Agency Review”
(“EAR”). Id. EAR is dissimilar to this Note’s proposal for several reasons. First, EAR arose
during a debate about whether manufacturers of generic drugs should be allowed to update their
labels without FDA preapproval. Proposed Generic Drug Labeling “CBE” Rule Turned on Its
“EAR”?, PHARM. DEV. GRP., https://pharmdevgroup.com/proposed-generic-drug-labeling-cberule-turned-on-its-ear [https://perma.cc/SHR5-ZENA]. My proposal, however, arises in the quite
dissimilar context of the Cures Act and applies only to manufacturers seeking to make label
changes to brand-name drugs. Second, under EAR, the manufacturer and the FDA seem to share
responsibility for flagging the submitted information for expedited FDA approval. See id. (“EAR
would require [new-drug-application or abbreviated-new-drug-application] holders to submit
new safety information to FDA.”). In contrast, my proposal maintains that the manufacturer has
the ultimate duty to seek FDA review for qualifying proposed label changes and can thus be
subject to FDCA enforcement actions for failing to do so. See infra Part III.
My proposal also differs from Professor Margaret Gilhooley’s proposal in 2008.
Professor Gilhooley suggested that manufacturers who think they might need to change their
label petition the FDA for its view. Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need To
Reform the FDA Consultation Process, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 539, 556 (2008). If the FDA responded
affirmatively, the manufacturer would follow the drug labeling rules to make that change. Id. My
proposal provides greater clarity by identifying a preset category of circumstances under which
the manufacturer must seek FDA preapproval and disclose information to the FDA. See infra
notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of the FDCA misbranding provisions178 to hold
manufacturers liable for misbranded drugs if they fail to seek timely
CBE-60 label changes. Part IV explains how these changes both
require manufacturers to promptly disclose information to the FDA
and protect manufacturers’ incentives to produce innovative therapies
under the Cures Act.
Under my proposal, CBE-0 would be available to a manufacturer
only to add, not to strengthen, a “contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction”179 to reflect information about a new,
substantial risk of serious bodily injury. As under the current CBE-0
rules,180 there must be a causal link between the drug and the risk.
My proposal would limit unilateral CBE-0 label changes in two
ways. First, a CBE-0 label change would be appropriate only if the risk
is of qualifying severity. For purposes of the modified CBE-0, a
“substantial risk of serious bodily injury” would be a risk that is
substantially likely to cause “(A) death; (B) protracted and obvious
disfigurement; or (C) protracted loss or impairment of the function of
a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”181 Second, this risk must
be “new.” Here, a risk would be new if it reflects “data, analyses, or
other information not previously submitted to the [FDA]” in any form
or “reveal[s] risks of a different type . . . than previously included in
[any] submissions to FDA.”182 Accordingly, the manufacturer could
not use the new CBE-0 to make a unilateral change that strengthens a
warning already on the label or that adds a warning about information
already contemplated by the FDA.
For all other label changes that are permissible under the current
CBE-0,183 the manufacturer would have to submit to the FDA a CBE-

178. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (authorizing the FDA to take action against a manufacturer
when “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular”). The FDA would bring an action when
the failure to update the label is so significant as to render the label “false or misleading.” Id.
179. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2021).
180. Id.
181. To create consistency across various drug laws, this definition modifies the definition of
“serious bodily injury” in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
See 21 U.S.C. § 802(25) (“The term ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which involves—
(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (C) protracted loss
or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”).
182. This definition adopts language from the FDA’s definition of “newly acquired
information” but omits the language “or greater severity or frequency than previously included
in submissions to FDA.” See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2021) (defining “newly acquired information”).
183. This includes changes that strengthen an existing warning, add a warning about a risk that
does not pose a substantial probability of death or serious bodily harm, or reflect information
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60 supplement. As with the current CBE rules, the CBE-60 supplement
would require the manufacturer to “give a full explanation of the basis
for the change,”184 including “[a] detailed description of the proposed
change” and “[a] description of the methods used . . . to assess the
effects of the change.”185 Once the FDA receives the supplement, it
would have sixty days to request an extension on review or to deny or
approve the label change. Even after approval, the FDA would retain
the right to modify or reject the change.186
CBE-60 would have three additional features that would allow it
to respond to the tension created by the Cures Act and the current
labeling rules.187 First, unlike the current CBE-0,188 CBE-60 would
require the manufacturer to receive FDA approval before marketing
the drug with the revised label. Because CBE-60 would require FDA
preapproval and would prevent manufacturers from changing their
labels unilaterally, manufacturers could not be held liable under state
tort law for failing to do so.189 Accordingly, CBE-60 would preempt
failure-to-warn claims for any safety and efficacy information that is
eligible for the CBE-60 labeling pathway, even if the manufacturer has
not submitted a CBE-60 supplement. Failure-to-warn claims could be
brought only against manufacturers that could change their labels
unilaterally under the new, narrower CBE-0.190
Second, the proposed CBE-60 would require the manufacturer to
satisfy continued disclosure and notice requirements. If the
manufacturer acquires additional information about the particular risk
after receiving a denial or extension request from the FDA, it must
submit another CBE-60 supplement or an addendum to its existing
about a risk of “greater severity or frequency than previously” submitted to the FDA. See id.
(defining “newly acquired information”).
184. See id. § 314.70(c)(3) (“A supplement submitted under paragraph (c)(1) of this section is
required to give a full explanation of the basis for the change and identify the date on which the
change is to be made.”).
185. See id. § 314.70(b)(3)(i)–(vii), (c)(4).
186. This accords with current practice under the labeling rules. See id. § 314.70(c)(7) (“If the
[FDA] disapproves . . . it may order the manufacturer to cease distribution . . . .”).
187. See supra Parts II–III.
188. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2021) (permitting the manufacturer to effectuate the label
change once the FDA receives the supplement); see also id. § 601.12(c)(5) (noting the same for
biologics).
189. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 569–72 (2009) (explaining that the failure-to-warn
claim is not preempted because Wyeth could have changed its label unilaterally, without first
receiving FDA approval).
190. See id. (explaining the preemption rationale); supra notes 179–182 and accompanying
text.
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CBE-60 supplement, respectively. Additionally, if the FDA fails to
respond by its sixty-day or extended deadline, the manufacturer must
submit a notice to the FDA within five days. These requirements
specify the manufacturer’s duty to maintain adequate drug labels
within the scope of CBE-60191 and to update the FDA after filing a
CBE-60 supplement. Because CBE-60 would automatically preempt
all failure-to-warn claims within its ambit, even absent affirmative
action by manufacturers, it must impose explicit postfiling
requirements to ensure that manufacturers are properly incentivized
to disclose updates to the FDA.
Third, CBE-60 would require the FDA to conduct a sixty-day
review of the proposed label changes. This is considerably shorter than
the FDA’s current six-to-ten-month review timeline for standard Prior
Approval Supplements (“PASs”) for certain major drug changes,192
such as changes in sterilization procedures;193 four-to-ten-month
timeline for priority PASs;194 and six-month timeline for most CBE-30
changes,195 such as changes in storage.196 However, the FDA has
previously operated on sixty-day review timelines.197 Although some of
these sixty-day reviews require only a cursory look before a longer,
substantive review,198 some involve a more searching inquiry. For

191. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2021) (identifying the manufacturer’s duty “to include a
warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug;
a causal relationship need not have been proved”).
192. Submission Review, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/industry/generic-drug-user-fee-amend
ments/submission-review [https://perma.cc/4S3Y-CP5Y], (last updated Jan. 8, 2019).
193. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(iii) (2021) (requiring manufacturers to receive FDA
preapproval before changing the sterilization methods for drugs); see also id. § 601.12(b)(2)(vi)
(same for biologics).
194. Submission Review, supra note 192.
195. Percentage of Manufacturing Supplements (CBE and CBE-30 Day Supplements) with
Action Due Dates Occurring During the Month That Were Reviewed and Acted upon Within 6
Months of Receipt (PDUFA) (1), FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fdatrack/view/
track.cfm?program=cber&id=CBER-OCBQ-CBE-Supplements-reviewed-and-acted-uponwithin-6-months [https://perma.cc/A9XP-GBEQ], (last updated Sept. 30, 2012) (showing that in
fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the FDA reviewed most CBE-30 submissions within six months of
receipt).
196. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i) (2021).
197. See, e.g., FDA, FDA AND INDUSTRY ACTIONS ON PREMARKET NOTIFICATION (510(K))
SUBMISSIONS: EFFECT ON FDA REVIEW CLOCK AND GOALS 11 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/
media/73507/download [https://perma.cc/3F96-FTBT] (noting that within sixty days of receipt, the
FDA “will conduct [a] substantive review” of medical device manufacturers’ 510(k) submissions
indicating their intent to market their devices).
198. See FDA, EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR REGENERATIVE MEDICINE THERAPIES FOR
SERIOUS CONDITIONS 8–9 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/120267/download [https://per
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example, section 505-1(h) of the FDCA gives the FDA sixty days to
“review and act on proposed minor [risk-mitigating strategies].”199
Under CBE-60, the FDA could extend the review period if it needs
additional time to assess the proposed label change.
Additionally, there is a key advantage to introducing CBE-60
instead of requiring manufacturers to seek FDA preapproval through
alternative labeling methods, such as PAS.200 PAS does not require
expedited review.201 Rather, a manufacturer may seek expedited
review, but only “for public health reasons or if [delaying the label
change] . . . would impose an extraordinary hardship on the
[manufacturer].”202 Moreover, PAS is typically reserved for changes
that the FDA defines as “major,” including changes to sterilization
methods.203 Currently, CBE-0 is the default pathway for manufacturers
“[t]o add or strengthen a [qualifying] contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction” on its label.204 To provide for
expedited review under PAS for these types of nonmajor label changes,
Congress and the FDA would need to revise the statutory and rule
language, respectively, concerning both CBE and PAS. In contrast, my
proposal changes only the statutory and rule language for CBE, leaving
PAS untouched.
To incentivize manufacturers to disclose safety information to the
FDA once it arises, CBE-60 should be paired with strict enforcement
of the FDCA misbranding provisions205 against manufacturers who fail
to seek timely CBE-60 label changes. Under section 502(f) of the
FDCA, a drug or device is misbranded if “its labeling [does not] bear
(1) adequate directions for use; and (2) such adequate warnings against
use in those pathological conditions or by children where its use may
be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or

ma.cc/N6S3-NXFU] (noting that the FDA will decide whether to give RMAT designation within
sixty calendar days after receiving the request).
199. FDA, RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES: MODIFICATIONS AND
REVISIONS 3 (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/128651/download [https://perma.cc/6K3T-9JHG]
(emphasis omitted).
200. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2021) (describing the rule for drugs); id. § 601.12(b)
(describing the rule for biologics).
201. Id. §§ 314.70(b)(4), 601.12(b)(4).
202. Id. §§ 314.70(b)(4), 601.12(b)(4).
203. See id. § 314.70(b)(2)(iii) (requiring manufacturers to receive FDA preapproval before
changing the sterilization methods for drugs); see also id. § 601.12(b)(2)(vi) (same for biologics).
204. See id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A); see also id. § 601.12(f)(2)(A).
205. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1).
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duration of administration or application.”206 To accompany CBE-60,
the FDA should strengthen enforcement of section 502(f). It must
aggressively take action against any manufacturer that it comes to
know has delayed filing a CBE-60 supplement for a label change that
is necessary to provide “adequate warnings.”207 The FDA could
initially send a warning letter to the noncompliant manufacturer,
detailing alleged violations and requesting that the manufacturer
promptly file a CBE-60 to avoid legal action.208 If the manufacturer
then fails to seek the label changes, the FDA could coordinate with the
U.S. Department of Justice to petition a district court to enjoin the
manufacturer from violating the FDCA.209 The injunction might
mandate that the manufacturer seek the appropriate label change
through CBE-60 and might prohibit the manufacturer from
distributing the drug until then.210 As Part IV explores, knowing that
the FDA will take civil action if it discovers that the manufacturer is
out of compliance with CBE-60 should incentivize manufacturers to
make timely label changes and disclosures to the FDA. In the post–
Cures Act era, the FDA must position itself as vigilant and decisive,
undoing its lingering reputation as a weak enforcer.211

206. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(f), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (defining a
properly branded label).
207. See id.
208. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 702, 21 U.S.C. § 372 (giving the secretary
of health and human services the broad authority “to conduct examinations and investigations for
the purposes of this chapter”); FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL: CHAPTER 4:
ADVISORY ACTIONS § 4-1, at 3–8 (2022), https://www.fda.gov/media/71878/download [https://
perma.cc/N5CR-SQAQ] (describing the FDA’s use of warning letters); see, e.g., Warning Letter
from E. Mark Harris, Program Div. Dir., Off. of Hum. & Animal Food Operations, FDA, to Mary
B. Young, Cofounder & Chief Exec. Officer, Young Living Essential Oils Corp. (June 10, 2022),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warningletters/young-living-essential-oils-corporate-615777-06102022 [https://perma.cc/M6YP-MQ3M].
209. See FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL: CHAPTER 6: JUDICIAL ACTIONS § 62, at 29–31 (2021) [hereinafter FDA MANUAL: CH. 6], https://www.fda.gov/media/71837/
download [https://perma.cc/ML9E-4HTA] (discussing case referrals from the FDA to the
Department of Justice); see also The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST.: CONSUMER PROT. BRANCH, https://www.justice.gov/civil/consumer-protection-branch29 [https://perma.cc/RFJ9-46SC], (last updated Nov. 17, 2021) (explaining, in part, how the FDA
and Department of Justice coordinate to bring enforcement actions in federal court).
210. See FDA MANUAL: CH. 6, supra note 209 (discussing case referrals from the FDA to the
Department of Justice).
211. See, e.g., Charles Piller, Exclusive: FDA Enforcement Actions Plummet Under Trump,
SCI.: SCIENCEINSIDER (July 2, 2019), https://www.science.org/content/article/exclusive-fdaenforcement-actions-plummet-under-trump [https://perma.cc/42MS-2SPJ] (quoting Patricia
Zettler, professor of law at the Ohio State University and former FDA attorney, as saying,
“FDA’s power to enforce its requirements is an important part of how it achieves its public health
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IV. JUSTIFYING THE PROPOSAL
My proposed labeling and liability regime would serve two
purposes. It would impose on manufacturers stricter requirements to
disclose postmarket safety information to the FDA before modifying
drug labels. It would also incentivizes voluntary compliance by both
creating a preemptive safe harbor from state tort liability and
strengthening FDCA misbranding enforcement. This Part explores the
nuances of and justifications for these proposed changes. Part IV.A
explains the reasons for distinguishing between CBE-0 and CBE-60.
Part IV.B then discusses CBE-60’s effect on the FDA’s ability to
collect and validate postmarket information. Finally, Part IV.C justifies
CBE-60’s preemptive effect as innovation protective.
A. Distinguishing the New CBE-0 and CBE-60
The proposed rules would permit manufacturers to change their
drug labels unilaterally under CBE-0 only to reflect information about
a new, substantial risk of serious bodily injury.212 This is a narrow
exception to the general requirement under CBE-60 that a
manufacturer seek FDA preapproval before marketing a drug with a
changed label.213 Accordingly, most postmarket label changes would
likely be made through CBE-60 and not CBE-0.
Restricting unilateral label changes to new, substantial risks of
serious bodily injury serves two purposes. First, consistent with the
FDA’s likely original intent for CBE-0, it would allow only a limited
exception to the general rule that the FDA must collect and evaluate
drug safety and efficacy data before the manufacturer markets the drug
with a particular label. As the FDA has explained, “The centerpiece of
risk management for prescription drugs generally is the labeling which
reflects thorough FDA review of the pertinent scientific
evidence . . . .”214 Indeed, the “FDA carefully controls the content of
labeling for a prescription drug.”215 As a result, the “FDA’s regulations
mission . . . . If FDA is not using that power, it sends a signal that violations will be tolerated”).
From President Donald Trump’s inauguration through May 22, 2019, the FDA “issued 1033
warning letters, compared with 1532 for the most recent equivalent period under former President
Barack Obama.” Id.
212. See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
214. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601
(2021))
215. Id.

ENGLE IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

896

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/16/2022 10:45 AM

[Vol. 72:861

permit changes in labeling without prior approval only in narrow
circumstances.”216 Before the Cures Act, the current CBE-0 might well
have been a limited exception, likely justified in part by the idea that
the FDA exercises notable preapproval authority to consider the
label’s contents.217 But by increasing the risk that adverse events will
not arise until the postmarket phase, the Cures Act limits the FDA’s
opportunities to collect, evaluate, and act on that information in the
first instance before approving the drug and its label.218 And it increases
the likelihood that manufacturers will encounter postmarket data that
justifies a unilateral label change under the current CBE-0 rule.219
After the Cures Act, CBE-0 is no longer a narrow carveout of the
FDA’s authority to gather and evaluate drug safety and efficacy
information. My proposed CBE-0 would restore the original balance
by offering only limited circumstances under which the manufacturer
could change its label without FDA preapproval.220
Second, the proposed labeling rules would predetermine a
category of risks in CBE-0 for which the risk of harm justifies the
manufacturer acting without first receiving FDA approval. When a
new, substantial risk of serious bodily injury arises, the urgency and
severity of the health risk warrant a departure from the default
preemptive, information-forcing system. Because the information is
new, the current label does not identify the risk for doctors and their
patients. Given the substantiality of the risk and the absence of any
warning whatsoever, the risk of overwarning is minimal. The need to
reduce harm to patients weighs in favor of the manufacturer making an
immediate, unilateral label change.221

216. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,606 (Aug. 22, 2008) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 314,
601, 814 (2021)); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2007 WL 4555760, at *18 (“FDA’s regulations permit changes
in labeling without prior approval only in narrow circumstances.”); Reply Brief for Petitioner at
8, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 4264481, at *8 (“FDA introduced the CBE
exception in 1965 as an incremental change to a regime that otherwise permitted no labeling
changes at all without prior approval . . . .”).
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra notes 179–183 (describing the proposed rule).
221. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 4264481,
at *8 (explaining that the FDA promulgated the CBE rules “so that new information or
conclusions about drug safety could be ‘placed into effect at the earliest possible time’” (quoting
Supplemental New-Drug Applications, 30 Fed. Reg. 993, 993 (Jan. 30, 1965))).
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However, when the manufacturer seeks to make any other label
change, the benefits are greater in requiring it to seek prior FDA
approval under CBE-60. If the desired label change is not new, as
defined under my proposed CBE-0,222 then the FDA has already
contemplated that risk in some form. With its access to existing safety
and efficacy data, the FDA is best equipped to validate postmarket
information and assess the merits of modifying information already on
the label or already contemplated by the agency.223 If the desired label
change does not pose a substantial risk of serious bodily harm, then
patients are less likely to suffer irreparable damage while the FDA
deliberates. The need for prompt notice to patients is outweighed by
the benefits of the FDA’s role in carefully assessing postmarket data.
The line between CBE-60 and CBE-0 could unavoidably be the
focus of future failure-to-warn litigation.224 However, this type of line
drawing is not unknown to legal practice. Judges and juries routinely
classify different actions, actors, and claims with careful precision.225 As
with any new rule, uncertainty about the proper distinction between
CBE-0 and CBE-60 could be addressed in the courts and may benefit
from additional guidance by the FDA.
B. Giving the FDA a New Role in Postmarket Oversight After the
Cures Act
The proposed labeling and liability regime would give the FDA a
postmarket role in forcing manufacturers to produce robust
postmarket information about their drugs. It would do so affirmatively
through CBE-60, which would expand the range of circumstances
under which manufacturers must disclose information and receive
FDA preapproval before making label changes. Unlike the current
labeling rules, my proposal places the onus on the manufacturers to
update the FDA as additional information arises and to nudge the
FDA if the agency is delinquent in its response.
In addition to these affirmative disclosure requirements, CBE-60’s
FDA preapproval requirement would create a preemptive safe harbor
that would help align manufacturers’ disclosure incentives with those

222. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 128–136 and accompanying text.
224. Plaintiffs would argue that the manufacturer possessed information that qualified for a
CBE-0 label change, while manufacturers would assert the opposite.
225. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing Doctrine and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1999) (describing line drawing in tax law).

ENGLE IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

898

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/16/2022 10:45 AM

[Vol. 72:861

of the FDA. Principally, it would reduce the manufacturer’s incentive
to make unilateral label changes for information within CBE-60’s
scope to avoid failure-to-warn liability.226
However, by removing the risk of failure-to-warn liability, the
preemptive safe harbor may reduce some manufacturers’ incentives to
seek timely label changes and make associated disclosures.227 Pairing
the preemptive safe harbor with stricter FDCA misbranding
enforcement could keep the pressure on these manufacturers to
disclose relevant information through CBE-60 label changes when they
would have otherwise withheld that data to avoid commercial losses.
In sum, CBE-60’s FDA preapproval requirement and preemptive
safe harbor, alongside the threat of FDCA enforcement, would
incentivize manufacturers to buy into the new rules, comply with CBE60’s stricter postfiling disclosure requirements, and align their
disclosure interests with those of the FDA. CBE-60 would do what the
Cures Act has not. It would shift the FDA’s role in forcing disclosure
of drug information to the postmarket phase, and it would require
manufacturers to undertake greater communication with the FDA for
a broader set of postmarket labeling changes than is contemplated
under the current rules.228 Relying on the FDA as the primary enforcer
of manufacturers’ disclosure compliance would protect the FDA’s
valuable role in compelling manufacturers to promptly generate
robust, balanced information about their drugs.
Beyond compelling manufacturers to generate and disclose
postmarket drug information, the proposed labeling rule would also
give the FDA a defined role in assessing a broader set of postmarket
information relevant to drug labeling.229 CBE-60’s FDA preapproval
requirement and preemptive safe harbor would ensure that the FDA
exercises ultimate authority to evaluate postmarket drug information.
For patients, this may deter potentially harmful overwarning.230
Patients and their doctors alike rely on “[t]he imprimatur of the

226. See supra Part II.A (describing manufacturers’ various incentives).
227. Id.
228. See supra Part III (describing the changes made under the proposed CBE-0 and CBE60).
229. See Kapczynski, supra note 83, at 2373 (noting that the FDA plays a vital role in
“validating information about medicines” (emphasis omitted)).
230. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601
(2021)) (describing the danger of overwarning).
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FDA”231 in its information-validating role and may feel greater
assurance when a centralized regulatory body, with broad information
access, has deemed accurate a drug’s safety and efficacy information.
For manufacturers, the FDA’s postmarket labeling authority would
provide additional postmarket certainty. Manufacturers would be
compelled to communicate directly with the FDA, which is best
equipped to give a balanced assessment of safety and efficacy data.232
In creating a new role for the FDA in gathering and evaluating
information for postmarket drug labeling, my proposal simply follows
a trend already underway in Congress. Over the past fifteen years,
Congress has increasingly shifted the FDA’s authority to the
postmarket phase. For example, through the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Congress gave the FDA the
authority to mandate postmarket label changes.233 Moreover, Congress
has already contemplated a regulatory system that demands a
partnership between drug manufacturers and the FDA. Under the
Cures Act, Congress laid the groundwork for the FDA to closely
communicate with industry partners, including drug manufacturers, to
monitor drug development.234 The proposed CBE-60 labeling rule
would solidify this dynamic in postmarket drug oversight and labeling.
C. Protecting Innovation After the Cures Act
CBE-60’s preemptive safe harbor is acutely important for
manufacturers, particularly small ones, that produce the innovative
drugs contemplated by the Cures Act. Given that the cost of drug

231. Reshma Ramachandran & Zackary Berger, 21st Century Cures Act Will Distort the
Meaning of ‘FDA Approved,’ STAT (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/01/21stcentury-cures-act-fda-approval [https://perma.cc/LUB5-9PLJ] (“The imprimatur of the FDA is
currently a kind of Good Housekeeping Seal of approval. Weakening the FDA’s standards would
undermine our trust and leave patients at a loss.”).
232. See supra notes 128–136 and accompanying text.
233. Pub L. No. 110-85, § 901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 924–26 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(o)(4)).
234. Implementing the 21st Century Cures Act: An Update from FDA and NIH: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 115th Cong. 12 (2017)
(statement of Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, FDA), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/congressionaltestimony/implementing-21st-century-cures-act-update-fda-and-nih-11292017-11292017 [https://
perma.cc/3ZCY-M9J7] (describing a workshop that brought “stakeholders, including industry,
academia, and patient advocacy groups, together to discuss both the challenges and opportunities
for applying [real-world evidence]” and noting that “FDA will continue to partner with a range
of stakeholders”).
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development continues to rise,235 reducing the risk of postmarket
liability would reduce one type of cost that could deter beneficial
innovation. As Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine safe harbor suggests,
lower liability risk and greater postmarket certainty can decrease the
expected cost of drug development, encourage drug production, and
facilitate patient access.236 This could benefit small manufacturers,
which are highly innovative—and thus developing drugs that receive
this flexible, expedited review—yet lack the capital and administrative
resources to manage postmarket liability.237 To fully promote drug
innovation after the Cures Act, these small manufacturers must be
protected.
By preempting some failure-to-warn claims, CBE-60 would
unavoidably restrict a common legal avenue by which patients seek
compensation for alleged drug injuries.238 However, CBE-60 and the
threat of FDCA misbranding enforcement would require
manufacturers to identify adverse drug information early and
cooperate with the FDA to promptly respond to those risks.239
Accordingly, CBE-60 should compel manufacturers to identify and act
on harms before harm is widespread, thereby reducing the incidence of
postmarket injuries and the subsequent need for ex post compensation.
CBE-60 would thus protect patients from harm while retaining
preemption’s innovation-protective benefits.240 Ultimately, CBE-60’s
disclosure requirements and preemptive safe harbor would strengthen
235. STEEDMAN ET AL., supra note 144, at 8 (“[N]ew drugs are becoming much more
expensive to develop and are targeting much smaller patient populations. Biopharma companies
therefore need to reduce the costs of their R&D or increase the value of their late-stage pipeline
assets to improve productivity.”).
236. See supra notes 148–158 and accompanying text; see also Cecilia Ong & Allen Kachalia,
Safe Harbors: Liability Reform for Patients and Physicians, BULL. OF THE AM. COLL. OF
SURGEONS (Mar. 2, 2013), https://bulletin.facs.org/2013/03/safe-harbors [https://perma.cc/AX7APLXZ] (“Safe harbors have many potential benefits, which include discouraging nonmeritorious
liability claims, [and] mitigating the unpredictability of settlements and verdicts . . . .”).
237. See supra notes 141–147 and accompanying text.
238. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the
Compensation Piece of the Preemption Puzzle, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 654 (2012) (noting that
“[t]ort . . . is an engine of compensation as well as deterrence” and that another scholar dislikes
preemption because it “leave[s] some victims uncompensated” (quoting Robert L. Rabin, Poking
Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 300–01 (2007))).
239. See supra Part IV.B.
240. The proposed CBE-0 and CBE-60 rules could be implemented alongside other
compensation options, such as a statutorily enacted victim compensation fund. See, e.g., National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccine-compensation/index.html [https://perma.cc/4TCJ-XRN6], (last updated Sept. 2022)
(describing how people injured by vaccines can petition for compensation from a fund).

ENGLE IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2023]

12/16/2022 10:45 AM

PRESCRIBING A CHANGE

901

the Cures Act’s emphasis on innovation while significantly reducing
the current gap in oversight of postmarket safety.
CONCLUSION
The Cures Act is a valuable step toward promoting patient access
to lifesaving treatments. But in its focus on expediting drug approvals,
it fails to account for what comes next. Expedited review, surrogate
endpoints, and real-world evidence remain essential tools for quickly
bringing drugs to market, but they may not detect vital safety and
efficacy information, leaving it to arise once the drug is already being
used by patients. The shift in discovery of safety and efficacy to the
postmarket phase creates two main problems, each exacerbated by the
current brand-name labeling rules. It frustrates the FDA’s role in
gathering and assessing drug information, to the detriment of patients.
It also raises the risk of substantial liability that could deter smaller
manufacturers from investing in beneficial drug development.
Both issues are fixable if Congress amends section 506A of the
FDCA to permit the FDA to modify its brand-name drug labeling rules
to require FDA preapproval and preempt failure-to-warn liability in
some circumstances. These changes would give the FDA a new role in
postmarket oversight and protect manufacturers’ incentives to
innovate. Simultaneously, the threat of stricter enforcement of the
FDCA misbranding provisions could help to incentivize manufacturers
to voluntarily comply with the proposed labeling rules.
Given the type of information disclosed in labeling changes, my
proposal would primarily remedy the oversight gap for postmarket
safety, not efficacy. Postmarket issues about efficacy, such as those
facing Aduhelm, are less likely to be the sole basis for a label change.
The FDA’s decisions about the proper postmarket response, however,
necessarily require the FDA to weigh a drug’s relative safety and
efficacy. Accordingly, the FDA must find a way to remain attentive to
efficacy issues that arise after drug approval. These changes would
nonetheless make valuable progress toward giving the FDA a
necessary, substantive role in postmarket oversight and encouraging
modern drug innovation under the Cures Act.

